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INTRODUCTION

In 1995, Peter Schuck began an important article by recalling the
summer of 1969, when physicians prescribed diethylstibestrol (DES)
to prevent miscarriages, soldiers sprayed Agent Orange freely in Vietnam, and crushing liability for asbestos companies remained in the future.' Mass torts had not yet become a phenomenon. Reflecting on the
subsequent twenty-five years of tumult, Schuck made a "preliminary"
effort to define a "mass tort system."2 Schuck expressed his optimism
that this system, a set of dispute resolution processes, could adequately
bring peace to complex mass harms. Since then, the mass tort system he
outlined has endured a true trial by fire. Scores of mass injuries, the ugly
underbelly of a global marketplace, have plagued American courts
with thousands of complicated cases. Several of the most ambitious efforts to herd such litigation toward an efficient and just conclusion have
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Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional EvolutionistPerspective,80 Cornell L Rev 941,

945-46 (1995). By the mid-1980s, DES had become the subject of many class actions. See Collins
v Eli Lilly Co, 342 NW2d 37, 45 (Wis 1984) (observing that approximately one thousand class
action suits were pending at the time DES was banned). Agent Orange led to a class settlement
of then-record-breaking proportions. See In re "Agent Orange" ProductLiability Litigation MDL

No 381, 818 F2d 145, 171-74 (2d Cir 1987) (approving a $180 million settlement agreement that
addressed an estimated 20,000 claims). The first major break in favor of asbestos plaintiffs came
in 1973. See Borel v FibreboardPaper Products Corp, 493 F2d 1076, 1103 (5th Cir 1973) (affirm-

ing a jury verdict holding defendants liable for failing to warn of dangers from asbestos exposure).
2
Schuck, 80 Cornell L Rev at 944 (cited in note 1).
3
See id at 980 (explaining that the mass tort system is favorable to the available alternatives because it takes the valuable elements from a common law approach, is consistent with a
contractual approach, and is likely to be more administrable than a bureaucratic approach).
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failed, at times in spectacular fashion.' A dozen years of mass tort litigation have put front and center the question of whether global peace the final resolution of a defendant's liability to thousands or even millions of possible plaintiffs-is possible in a legal system that begins with
the premise that each individual has a right to her own day in court!
An answer should begin with a thorough reevaluation of the mass
tort system Schuck outlined, and Richard Nagareda has provided one
in his Mass Torts in a World of Settlement. Nagareda addresses the cen-

tral problem for the mass tort system: how can a small group of private
lawyers craft a global settlement that binds even prospective claimants
whose injuries have not yet developed and once and for all extinguish
the defendant's tort liability? He masterfully crafts an analytical
framework from a variety of doctrinal materials to explain the mass
tort system and assess its successes and failures. Nagareda explains why
parties choose to settle mass torts, how peacemaking lawyers try to
create global peace that binds even future claimants, and why these efforts have proven largely unsuccessful over the past dozen or so years.
Nagareda starts with a straightforward premise: peacemaking in
mass torts is a form of governance. When a defendant engages in allegedly injurious conduct, prospective claimants acquire legal rights defined by the applicable substantive law. Settlements require these individuals to exchange these preexisting rights to sue for relief generated by a compensation regime. For mass torts, private lawyers who
have no formal relationship with the vast majority of claimants they
purport to represent must nonetheless bind these claimants to settlements. The power of these lawyers to engage in what amounts to privatized law reform begs a problem of legitimacy. Nagareda argues that
litigation-based ideals of due process that stress individual autonomy
and conflict-free representation as prerequisites for legitimate gover4
One example in this respect is the various attempts to bring class actions against tobacco
companies for injuries caused by purchasing and smoking cigarettes. See Schwab v Philip Morris
USA, Inc, 449 F Supp 2d 992,1026-27 (EDNY 2006) (summarizing tobacco litigation cases). See
also In re Simon H Litigation,407 F3d 125, 127-28 (2d Cir 2005) (decertifying nationwide punitive damages class action against tobacco companies); Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d
734, 746 (5th Cir 1996) (decertifying nationwide class action against tobacco companies); Robert
L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 Loyola LA L Rev
(forthcoming 2008) (discussing a series of class action suits alleging nicotine addiction, fraud, and
second-hand smoke injuries). Another example is the failed efforts to resolve asbestos liability in
large settlements on behalf of nationwide classes. See generally Ortiz v FibreboardCorp, 527 US
815 (1999) (reversing the approval of class certification); Amchem Products,Inc v Windsor, 521
US 591 (1997) (affirming the denial of class certification).
5
See, for example, Ortiz, 527 US at 846. Compare Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked": Mass
Torts and AggregateAsbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tex L Rev 1925, 1930 (2002)
(criticizing this premise as "nostalgic" and a "halcyon" ideal out of sync with the reality of mass
tort dispute resolution).
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nance collide with the real-world dynamics that lead parties to settle
mass torts in the first place.
A solution to the difficulties that mass torts pose starts with the
recognition that they are not primarily problems of tort or procedural
doctrine but of legitimate governance. This perspective frees Nagareda
from the shackles of litigation to turn to administration for a source of
legitimacy. He observes that mass tort settlements function as a form of
administration. Parties create a compensation regime, akin to a workers'
compensation system, that cuts off access to tort and binds claimants
going forward to a certain range of payments. Accordingly, a concept of
legitimacy rooted in administration, not litigation, should govern mass
tort settlements. Agencies have legitimate law reform power-that is,
lawful power to alter citizens' preexisting rights-because administrators are accountable over time to those they govern. Nagareda proposes
the same for mass torts. A fee arrangement can align the incentives of
peacemaking lawyers with all claimants, including those whose injuries
will become manifest in the future, by extending their relationship over
time. With a proper fee arrangement in place, a settlement will be legitimated by Nagareda's metric. Agencies could adopt such settlements as
rules to ensure that the peace they provide is truly global.
Nagareda grounds his analytical framework in a comprehensive
survey of virtually every significant attempt to resolve a mass tort over
the past decade. In Part I, I summarize the four parts of Nagareda's book
and offer some reactions along the way. It is nuanced and detailed, so
my summary, albeit lengthy, can offer only a sketch of Nagareda's
carefully forged argument. He shows repeatedly how the real world of
mass torts, with unseemly but unavoidable conflicting incentives between lawyers and clients, clashes with litigation-centered ideals of governance. The great virtue in Nagareda's account lies in this realism and
the lessons it inspires for mass tort governance.
In Part II, I challenge Nagareda's notion of preexisting legal rights,
a discordantly formalist thread in an otherwise insistently realist fabric.
Nagareda claims that individuals come to mass tort settlements with
preexisting rights to sue defined by the applicable substantive law, and
that settlements amount to law reform because they replace these preexisting rights. In my view, Nagareda has drawn too rigid a boundary between the substantive component of an individual's right to sue and the
procedural options the individual has for its attempted vindication. A
realist perspective treats available procedural avenues as constituent
components of rights to sue. Construed accordingly, many rights to sue
have real-world existence only as parts of class actions. This understand-
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ing supports David Shapiro's "entity" theory of the class,6 which would
give courts greater flexibility in the administration of aggregate litigation.
A realist perspective makes class action litigation a more viable institutional setting for mass tort governance than Nagareda would admit.
I intend my disagreement with Nagareda not as criticism but rather
as thoughts stimulated by his insightful account. Rigorously rooted in
the messy details of attempted mass tort settlements, as well as the
entire terrain of mass tort litigation and commentary of the past dozen
years, Nagareda's book is a tour de force. Mass Torts in a World of Set-

tlement is as thorough as it is elegant. A rarity among academic commentary, the book should become required reading for scholars, judges,
and mass tort practitioners alike as they search for just and efficient
paths to peace.
I. NAGAREDA'S REALISM-A SUMMARY OF HIS ARGUMENT

A. The Mass Tort Problem
A consistent undercurrent runs through Nagareda's book: in their
prescriptions to solve some of the problems that bedevil peacemaking
for mass torts, courts and commentators have ignored or misunderstood
the real-world dynamics that produce the incentives to make peace in
the first place. Nagareda's realism about mass tort settlements leads
him to begin his argument not in the treetops of appellate court doctrine but in the roots of how and when parties try to resolve mass torts
in an aggregate fashion. Nagareda argues that peacemaking does and
should occur when a mass tort is mature but that courts cannot adequately police the maturity boundary.
1. The maturation process.
Nagareda uses the orthodox account of the mass tort maturation
process to describe what propels the parties to try to craft a global
peace.7 A mass tort is immature until plaintiffs' lawyers can establish a
"credible threat" that their clients can prevail on each element of their
claims (pp 13, 29). This effort, which requires investment in "generic
assets," such as experts to establish general causation or research on
novel legal theories, gives plaintiffs' lawyers an incentive to recruit new

6

See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L

Rev 913,931 (1998). See also Part II.B.
7

For the standard account, see Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges,

73 Tex L Rev 1821,1842-43 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mass Tort Litigation,69 BU
L Rev 659, 659 (1989). See also Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manualfor Complex Litigation, 148 U Pa L Rev 2225,2251 (2000).
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clients to spread these costs. Meanwhile, defendants look for ways to
"knock out" the entire mass tort by, for example, finding scientific evidence that refutes allegations of general causation (p 15).
The proof of a mass tort's maturity is in the pudding. Plaintiffs
with high-value injuries begin to win at trial, showing that claimants
can establish each element of the claims at issue and creating fears of
ruinous verdicts for defendants. Their investments beginning to pay
off, plaintiffs' lawyers redouble client recruitment efforts. Once the
pool of high-value claimants dries up, lawyers then add exposed-butpresently-unimpaired clients -future claimants - into their inventories.
At this point, the mass tort begins to exhibit "dysfunctions" (p 20).
Most importantly, "the claims of exposed but unimpaired persons can
start to exhibit settlement values out of line with current tort doctrine"
(p 20). Whereas tort doctrine affords little merit to unimpaired claimants'
cases (pp 22-24), Nagareda argues, plaintiffs' lawyers can leverage the
threat of ruinous verdicts on behalf of presently impaired claimants into
an aggregate settlement that includes future claimants as well (p 25).
Defendants now want a settlement that allows them to avoid both
ruinous verdicts and the payment of present damages to claimants whose
injuries, if any, will only become manifest in the future. This settlement
should eliminate variance of outcomes and pay present claimants at an
acceptable level, based on accurate information about claim values
created by the maturation process. It should also lock future claimants
into a compensation schedule that avoids dysfunctions (p 28). Plaintiffs'
lawyers will quite happily settle claims of future claimants, persons who
might never end up as their clients, if they can get sizeable settlements
for their present claimant clients. Their relationship with these clients,
after all, generates their fees (pp 224-25).8 incentives among the
present parties thus align for a global peace.
Nagareda explains how courts try to police the boundary between
immature and mature torts and argues that they are not institutionally
well suited to guard against "imperfections" that might propel mass
torts toward settlements unwarranted by fact or law. For example,
judges can wield the Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc9 standard for the admission of expert testimony' to ensure that inaccurate
information about general causation does not push a mass tort into a
settlement that bears little relationship to the defendant's liability un8
See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343,1373-75 (1995).
9 509 US 579 (1993).
10 See id at 587, 597 (adopting a standard requiring federal judges to ensure that expert
scientific testimony admitted at trial is relevant and reliable as required under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702).
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der the applicable substantive tort doctrine (pp 39-40). Nagareda's
second example is Judge Richard Posner's opinion in In the Matter of
Rhone-PoulencRorer Inc," litigation brought by persons with hemophilia against blood clotting factor manufacturers whose product allegedly
infected them with HIV/AIDS."2 When plaintiffs have yet to establish

credible threats under the applicable doctrine -for example, when they
have won only a few idiosyncratic early individual trials-courts can
deny class certification. Courts thereby can shield risk-averse defen-

dants against pressure that might otherwise force them into an unmerited settlement driven by fears of a catastrophic class judgment
awarded by a biased jury."
11 51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995).
12 See id at 1296.
13 As Nagareda acknowledges (pp 44,48), whether class certification causes or should take
account of settlement pressure is a point in substantial dispute. See, for example, Klay v Humana,
Inc, 382 F3d 1241, 1275-76 (11th Cir 2004) (stating that settlement pressure is not a sufficient
reason to overturn class certification); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification
and Blackmail,78 NYU L Rev 1357,1379-80 (2003) (questioning Posner's class decertification in In
the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc after considering the settlements already entered into by the defendant). See generally J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure,25 Intl Rev L & Econ 264 (2005) (questioning
the effectiveness of settlement pressure in litigation against corporate defendants). Nagareda
addresses one response to the settlement pressure problem: pre-trial case management can
protect a defendant, even in a certified class, from entering into unmerited settlements. He
doubts that summary judgment can effectively sort out cases that deserve to settle from those
that do not. Cases with a moderately low probability of success might meet the low threshold
summary judgment sets but do not deserve to settle (p 51). See also Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents:Class Settlement Pressure,Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106
Colum L Rev 1872, 1891 (2006). But summary judgment is not the only shield the court can wield.
In Wadleigh v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc, the district court certified for class treatment only issues
pertaining to the defendant's negligence. 157 FRD 410, 423 (ND I11
1994). The trial plan would
have required individual plaintiffs to take the class verdict to their home jurisdictions; file suit;
and litigate proximate cause, damages, and affirmative defenses one by one. In other words,
plaintiffs had quite a long way to go before the specter of firm-shattering liability haunted the
defendants See In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1307 (Rovner dissenting). Arguably,
the trial plan could have protected against cognitive biases created by proof of defendant's bad
behavior and only allowed recovery if a plaintiff actually could prove causation. See, for example,
Hal R. Arkes and Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpracticev. the Business JudgmentRule: Differences
in Hindsight Bias,73 Or L Rev 587,633-35 (1994) (showing how bifurcated trial plans can protect
defendants against hindsight bias).
Whether the bifurcated trial plan would have spared the In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc defendant from undue settlement pressure depends on whether the heart of the case lay with the
core liability issues certified for class treatment or with the issues left for individual trials. The
plaintiffs pursued a novel theory of liability, which if accepted by the class jury in the certified part
of the case, would have greatly tipped the scales in the plaintiffs' favor. In the Matter of RhonePoulenc, 51 F3d at 1300-01 (describing the plaintiff's "serendipity" theory, which argued that
defendants' failure to protect hemophiliacs from Hepatitis B made defendants liable for any
consequences that such protection would have avoided). But, given the rejection by most jurisdictions of market share liability theories for blood factor defendants, and given the difficulty
many blood factor plaintiffs had in showing which among the various blood factor companies
manufactured the product that infected them, there is some reason to think that plaintiffs in
individual trials would have had quite difficult times establishing individual causation. See, for
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Nagareda sees in Daubertand In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc "topdown, third-party" efforts to "reassert the primacy of tort doctrine over
the distorting effects that litigation dynamics or aggregative procedure
may have" (pp 30, 53). Such regulatory efforts work imperfectly. Judges
have to immerse themselves in subjects well beyond their expertise to
use Daubert effectively to police the maturity boundary. Courts tempted
to deny class certification to guard against settlement pressure in anemic cases have to determine that the case is indeed anemic and not one
that merits a settlement. They have to scrutinize verdicts in individual
trials to determine whether the few juries that ruled for plaintiffs did
so because plaintiffs met their evidentiary burden on the elements of
their claims, or whether juries were swayed by some sort of cognitive
bias in favor of plaintiffs that obscured otherwise fatal weaknesses in
their cases. Judges, Nagareda notes, cannot look behind verdicts and
thus lack the institutional capacity to undertake this exercise (p 52). A
"bottom-up, first-party" mechanism, by which the parties themselves
police the maturity boundary, is preferable (p 54). Nagareda ultimately argues that his fee arrangement fits this bill.
2.

Reactions.

By fitting Daubert and In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc into the maturity framework, Nagareda casts illuminating light on the functional
roles pre-trial decisions play in linking settlement outcomes to a defendant's expected liability according to applicable substantive law. He
thereby makes an important contribution to the maturity account. With
terms like "dysfunctions," "imperfections," and "distorting effects," Nagareda adds two layers of normative gloss to this orthodox description
of how mass torts evolve. First, as he argues explicitly, mass torts
should not settle until mature. Payments to exposed but unimpaired
claimants, a symptom of a mass tort dysfunction at the mature stage,
can dry up funds to pay genuinely injured victims (pp 20-21). Second,
as his analysis implies, a mass tort should mature only when a steady
drumbeat of plaintiffs' verdicts in individual trials establishes a credible threat that claimants can consistently satisfy all elements of the
operative substantive tort law (pp 52-53).

example, Doe v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 380 F3d 399, 408 (8th Cir 2004) (discussing the Iowa
Supreme Court's rejection of the market share liability theory). See also Andrew R. Klein, A
Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 12 Yale J Reg 107,
109 (1995) (observing that only one state supreme court and one federal district court applied
market share theories to excuse plaintiffs from identifying which blood factor defendant infected
them). If this was so, then perhaps the bifurcated trial plan could have at least lessened the intensity of any settlement pressure that class certification would have put on the defendants.
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I will not rehash debates over Nagareda's first normative claim

here." As for the second, I wonder why formal elements of tort doctrine
necessarily provide the appropriate measure to determine when mass
tort settlements result from "dysfunctions" or "imperfections," and
when they are justified. 5 Nagareda asserts that "[a]ny legal system that
does not implement accurately the standards of applicable substantive
law hardly would be a system worthy of applause" (p 20). Perhaps, but

whether a legal system that assigns no liability to a defendant that has
caused harm to one-third of a population-because individual plain-

tiffs cannot meet each element of a claim-merits such applause is
hardly self-evident." In the blood factor litigation, for example, plaintiffs
often lost because they could not prove which defendant had infected

them." Yet general causation seemed indisputable. Between 55 and 78
percent of persons with hemophilia were HIV positive within three
years of the discovery of AIDS, 8 and the defendants likely did not ade-

quately warn even when they knew that their products were killing
people." The blood factor litigation in the end did settle, but downward

14

See, for example, Willging, 148 U Pa L Rev at 2246-53 (cited in note 7) (criticizing the

maturity concept and its role in deciding, for example, when to make class action settlements).
Compare Schuck, 80 Cornell L Rev at 950 (cited in note 1) (supporting the maturity concept),
with David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons
from a Special Master,69 BU L Rev 695,707-11 (1989) (criticizing the maturity concept).
15 For related criticism of Nagareda on this point, see Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the
Couch: The Strategic Uses ofAmbiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum L Rev 1924,1932-33 (2006).
16 Compare Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 931 (cited in note 6) (explaining why damages awarded to a class as a whole in such a case are justified from the perspective of deterrence
and reasonable compensation).
17 This difficulty manifested itself in two ways. Most importantly, persons with hemophilia
in the 1980s, when most of the infections occurred, ingested products manufactured by multiple
defendants, most of whom failed to protect against transmission of HIV. Thus, someone who
contracted HIV had a difficult time pinpointing the defendant that caused her illnes See, for
example, Ray v Cutter Laboratories,Division of Miles, Inc, 744 F Supp 1124, 1126 (MD Fla 1990).
Also, although perhaps less frequently, persons with hemophilia may have ingested other blood
products, in addition to clotting factors, that could have transmitted the virus and had difficulty
pinning the blame on a defendant product. See, for example, Spencer v Baxter International,Inc,
163 F Supp 2d 74,79,80 n 7 (D Mass 2001).
18 See M.M. Lederman, et al, Acquisition of Antibody to Lymphadenopathy-associated
Virus in Patients with Classic Hemophilia, 102 Annals of Intern Med 753, 753-57 (1985); WA.
Andes, S.R. Rangan, and K.M. Wulff, Exposure of Heterosexuals to Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and Viremia: Evidence for Continuing Risks in Spouses of Hemophiliacs, 16 Sexually
Transmitted Diseases 68,68-73 (1989).
19 See, for example, Elizabeth Amon, In the 1980s, Thousands of Hemophiliacs around the
World Became Infected with HIV after Using Tainted Blood Products. Could Their Illnesses and
Deaths Have Been Prevented?,The American Lawyer 77 (Dec 2004); Gina Kolata, Hit Hard by
the AIDS Virus, HemophiliacsAngrily Speak Out, NY Tunes 7 (Dec 25,1991). See also George W.
Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 Yale
L J 1087, 1107-11 (2000) (criticizing conduct of blood factor defendants); Michael J. Miller, Note,
Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Carefor Transfusion-transmittedDisease,36 Ariz
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pressure generated by the Seventh Circuit's denial of class certification
may have meant an unjustly depressed amount per claimant.2 Perhaps
plaintiffs could not strictly meet each element of their tort claims. But a
settlement that made defendants pay adequately for the harm they
caused, even if spurred by pressure created by class certification, would
not have obviously besmirched the American civil justice system.
Nagareda obviously cannot exhaustively defend every point he
makes. But the starting point of substantive law as an ideal that settlement must respect reappears as a theme throughout his book. The
clear import of his argument is that courts should never certify litigation classes-that is, grant contested certification motions-in mass
torts (see, for example, p 92). An elaboration on why substantive law
necessarily places this limit on case management through class certification would have added helpful ballast to Nagareda's overall argument.
B.

From Litigation to Administration

Nagareda turns from the "when" and "why" of peacemaking to its
"how" in Part II. At this point, the mass tort has matured and settlement becomes the order of the day. Peacemakers want finally to terminate access to the tort system, including that of future claimants, and
attempt to replace rights to sue with an administrative compensation
regime. This turn from tort triggers two problems: (1) how do lawyers
create the "grid" that generates compensation for future claimants within the terms of the peace; and (2) what gives lawyers the rulemaking
power legitimately to craft a compensation regime that displaces future
claimants' litigation rights (p 63). The latter-the source of legitimacy
for what amounts to privatized law reform-proves the central challenge, both theoretically and practically, for peacemaking.
1. Generating the grid.
Peacemakers create compensation grids of the sort familiar to government entitlement programs (p 65). Claimants present their histories
to the entity that administers the settlement,2' the claims administrator
L Rev 473, 480 n 55 (1994) (showing much greater incidence of HIV among people who used
defendants' products).
20 See Jay Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies 99 (Federal
Judicial Center 1998) (noting that claimants in Japan recovered twice the amount the American
class members won). For a discussion of how class certification denial may exert downward
pressure on settlement thresholds, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action
Certification,33 Hofstra L Rev 51,79-80 (2004).
21 Peacemaking lawyers turn over the administration of class settlements to so-called
"claims resolution facilities," private firms that specialize in the disbursement of class action
settlements. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-induced Claims
Resolution Facilities,57 Stan L Rev 1429 (2005).
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assigns claimants to cells in the grid, and these cells generate a specified

payment. Provided that it proceeds without "dysfunctions," the maturation process usually involves individual trials on various types of claims
that then signal to peacemakers what values to put in each cell."
Gridmaking turns both on "pragmatic considerations" and "also on
the compromises needed to bring about the adoption of the grid in the

first place" (p 64). Nagareda's analysis suggests several such compromises. Plaintiffs will demand compensation without having to prove a
difficult element of the tort at issue, or they might require defendants
to waive certain affirmative defenses. Defendants in exchange will insist
upon a reduction of the variance in outcomes of plaintiffs' claims (p 64),
as well as an assurance that the payout future claimants receive fairly
reflects the value that the underlying tort doctrine assigns their claims.3
Most importantly, the deal must bind high-value claimants, the sort of
plaintiffs who threaten defendants with unpredictable and ruinous
liability in tort. Defendants are unlikely to agree to a settlement that
does not include high-value claimants and only affects claimants with
less valuable or more tenuous claims.
2. Legitimacy.
These "compromises" that alter parties' rights make gridmaking a
form of privatized law reform. As the Supreme Court has declared, the
22
For additional discussion of this point, see Issacharoff, 80 Tex L Rev at 1928 (cited in
note 5). Recent litigation over Vioxx illustrates how judicial management of a mass tort can
recreate the maturity process by which individual trials create values for a compensation grid.
Both Judge Eldon Fallon, who supervised the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL), and Judge
Carol Higbee, who supervised coordinated proceedings in cases filed in New Jersey state courts
(Merck's home state), used carefully selected bellwether trials to establish settlement values for
various categories of claims against Merck, Vioxx's manufacturer. See, for example, Susan Todd,
Behind the Scenes of the Vioxx Settlement, Newark Star-Ledger 1 (Nov 18, 2007); Kristen Hays,
Judge Decries Effort to Have Vioxx Cases Tried in State Courts,Philadelphia Inquirer C7 (Oct 28,
2005) (describing Judge Fallon's goal to reach a global settlement of the Vioxx cases). See also
Howard M. Erichson, The Vioxx Settlement, Mass Tort Litigation Blog (Nov 10, 2007) online at
http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass-tortlitigation/2007/11/the-vioxx-settl.html (visited Aug
29, 2008) (discussing the strategic and procedural implications of the Vioxx settlement).
23 Nagareda illustrates his point with Cimino v Raymark Industries,Inc, 751 F Supp 649
(ED Tex 1990), reversed, 151 F3d 297 (5th Cir 1998) (involving class action asbestos litigation).
There, Judge Robert Parker famously tried to use statistical sampling from data derived from
representative trials to generate a grid that would pay compensation to the thousands of asbestos plaintiffs that had clogged his federal district in lieu of having them all go to trial. Judge
Parker's gridmaking, Nagareda maintains, "laid bare, in a published judicial opinion, the inner
workings of practices that usually operate below the judicial radar screen in mass tort litigation"
(p 69). The defendants refused to go along (and eventually stopped Judge Parker's efforts on
appeal) because the grid did not give them the necessary quid pro quo to secure their cooperation. It only bound existing claimants, leaving the defendants at the continued mercy of future
claimants, and the representative trials generated values for certain types of claims inconsistent
with what tort doctrine would have provided (p 69).
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right to sue, which the grid replaces, is a form of property (pp 58-59).2'
In run-of-the-mill individual litigation, a plaintiff freely enters a voluntary contractual relationship with her lawyer. Just as a contract authorizes a real estate agent to sell her client's house, the professional services agreement gives an attorney legitimate power to settle and thereby sell her client's property to the defendant (p 60). When lawyers
generate a grid for future claimants, who are not their clients, autonomy and contractual consent play no role. "[T]he administration of
[such] mass tort claims stands to act upon an individual's right to sue
not in the manner of a real estate agent retained by contract," Nagareda argues, "but, rather, like a local government condemning real
property and providing 'just compensation' to the property owner"
(p 60). As such, peacemaking is governance. This fact begs the question: what confers on private lawyers the institutional authority legitimately to engage in this form of law reform?
Nagareda finds the structure of this governing authority in Amchem Products v Windsor' and Ortiz v Fibreboard" a pair of landmark
Supreme Court decisions he ultimately criticizes. Both cases emerged
from the asbestos onslaught that plagued the federal courts starting in
the 1970s." In Amchem, a consortium of twenty asbestos companies
tried to strike a deal with plaintiffs' lawyers who represented large inventories of presently injured asbestos claimants. The defendants agreed
to pay these claimants hundreds of millions of dollars." The parties
then jointly moved to certify a settlement class of future asbestos claimants, prospective parties with whom the peacemaking plaintiffs' lawyers had no actual relationship. The class settlement would have created
a compensation grid for future claimants to generate predictable and
acceptably large (from the defendants' perspective) awards.29
The Ortiz defendant tried to settle its asbestos liability in one fell
swoop by moving with the plaintiffs' lawyers for certification of a settlement class. The settlement would have bound future asbestos claimants to a compensation grid with total payouts capped basically at the
extent of the defendant's insurance coverage. The parties argued that
this sum amounted to a "limited fund" and thus justified mandatory
class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), with no

24

Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797,807 (1985).

25 521 US 591 (1997).
26 527 US 815 (1999).
27 See Amchem, 521 US at 598.
28 Idat601.
29

30

For the settlement terms, see id at 603-05.
Ortiz, 527 US at 824-25.
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opt-out rights for absent class members." As in Amchem, the defendant entered a separate settlement with the same plaintiffs' lawyers
who negotiated the class settlement that resolved the pending claims.
The defendant made the separate settlement, which would have provided $500 million for the attorneys' inventory cases and thus $167 million in fees, 2 contingent upon judicial approval of the class settlement."
The Court rejected certification in both cases, stressing in each
the conflict of interest created when present claimants and their lawyers negotiate a settlement for future claimants only. ' In Ortiz, for
example, present claimants secured notably high recoveries in the separate settlement, while the class settlement saddled future claimants
with a cumbersome claims process and capped their awards to more
modest amounts.3 Present claimants in Amchem similarly did quite
well vis-A-vis future claimants.' Both cases illustrate the central problem in peacemaking. Present claimants enjoy the leverage that produces settlement incentives and thus hold all the cards. The lawyers
who represent them will willingly exchange future claimants' rights to
sue for increased recoveries for their present claimant clients and thereby generate bigger fees for themselves. Because future claimants
have nothing (yet) to threaten the defendants with, and because they
lack a fee-generating relationship with plaintiffs' lawyers, future claimants get the short end of the stick.
Although perturbed by the proposed settlements in both cases,
the Court left a foundational principle for class actions intact. Selfappointed peacemakers can legitimately sell absent class members'
rights to sue as part of a settlement if at a minimum they adequately
represent the interests of these absent members.37 Valid interest representation creates legitimate governing authority. Nagareda mines Am31

See id at 828. Rule 23(b)(1) allows courts to certify class actions with no opt-out rights

for class members when "the prosecution of separate actions ... would create a risk" of "adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." FRCP 23(b)(1)(B). These include cases
involving "limited funds"-cases, for example, where "the totals of the aggregated liquidated
claims and the fund available for satisfying them, set definitely at their maximums, demonstrate
the inadequacy of the fund to pay all the claims." Ortiz, 527 US at 838. The parties in Amchem
sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which would have entitled class members to the right to
opt out. See Amchem, 521 US at 605.
32
Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1401 (cited in note 8).
33
Ortiz, 527 US at 852.
34
See Amchem, 521 US at 625-27; Ortiz, 527 US at 856.
35
See 527 US at 855.
36 Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 8) (observing that inventory clients in one
separate settlement received payouts 54 percent higher than what they would have received
pursuant to the class settlement).
37
See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32,42 (1940).
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chem and Ortiz for three "components" that mark the bounds of this
power (p 79). First, "class actions enjoy no general authority to alter the
preexisting rights of class members" (p 79) (emphasis added). Agencies
can promulgate rules that change bundles of rights individuals enjoy
under existing law only if they have the delegated power to do so. The
quality of the promulgated rules cannot justify the power to promulgate them in the first place (pp 81-82). Analogously, as the Court in
Amchem put it, peacemakers must find a source of delegation in matters that "preexist any settlement."0 A settlement's substantive fairness
does not excuse an inquiry into Rule 23's requirements for certification. 9 Matters like the adequacy of representation, the cohesion of the
class, and the nature of class members' claims, which exist prior to and
independent of the settlement itself, decide the certification question.4
Similarly, the parties in Ortiz could not craft a limited fund for the purposes of class settlement, then argue that this limited fund meets certification requirements and justifies their power to enter into a class settlement. "[S]omething antecedent to all the good that its exercise
might do" must legitimate peacemaking power (p 82).
Second, Amchem and Ortiz establish that the scope of power delegated to class counsel "must stop short of the [essentially unchecked]
legislative power that Congress might wield to alter preexisting rights"
(p 84). Class certification requirements in Rule 23 provide an "intelligible principle" that limits the scope of class counsel's power to replace
absent class members' preexisting rights to sue with a compensation
grid (p 87). If class counsel could get a class certified without meeting
these requirements, their power would exceed the Rules Enabling
Act's4 admonition that the operation of procedural rules not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right 42 (p 87).
Third, Amchem and Ortiz provide the substantive limits on this delegated power: class counsel can sell the rights of class members to sue
if the class is sufficiently cohesive, and if class counsel has no conflicting interests with class members (p 87). The settlements in Amchem
and Ortiz failed by this metric. As the Court observed in Amchem,
present claimants had an interest in "generous immediate payments,"
while the future claimants they purported to represent would want
'

38

521 US at 623.

Id. For criticism of the supposed fairness of the Amchem settlement, see Coffee, 95
Colum L Rev at 1393-95 (cited in note 8); Susan P Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Prods, Inc., 80 Cornell L Rev 1045, 1066-67 (1995) (suggesting that class
counsel's clients had an advantage over other class members).
40 Amchem, 521 US at 623-28.
41
Rules Enabling Act, Pub L No 73-415, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended at 28
USC § 2072 (2000).
42 28 USC § 2072(b). See Amchem, 521 US at 613; Ortiz, 527 US at 845.
39
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"an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future."3 Class counsel in
Ortiz wanted their side settlement to succeed along with the fees it
promised to generate. The class settlement, on whose approval the
side settlement depended, would not generate any fees for them. Their
only incentive, then, was to push the defendant for whatever minimal
class settlement "might survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing," not
"the best possible arrangement" for the future claimant class.4
This endpoint for Amchem and Ortiz-cohesive, conflict-free interest representation as a sine qua non for legitimate privatized law
reform-comes as little surprise. Valid interest representation has long
functioned as the due process substitute for contractual attorney-client
relationships that enable lawyers to settle their clients' claims consis5 Amchern and Ortiz fit in a familiar
tent with individual autonomy."
syllogism: (1) an individual's right to sue is a property right protected
by the Due Process Clause; (2) valid interest representation can substitute for individual client consent to a settlement;" (3) valid interest
representation requires conflict-free cohesion among class members;
and thus (4) due process requires conflict-free cohesion among class
members in order to bind them to a class judgment."
Nagareda's realism about when and why parties settle mass torts
leads him to identify a profound and important flaw in the point of
departure for this familiar formula. As he argues, "Settlement structure
drives class certification, not vice versa" (p 91). Defendants' interest in a
class settlement for future claims comes from the leverage lawyers for
present claimants enjoy based on the credible threat their clients pose
to the defendants. This in turn leads present claimants to use future
43

521 US at 626.

44

527 US at 852.

Hansberry, 311 US at 41, 44-45 (stating that a class judgment can preclude an absent
class member who was not a party to the earlier suit if the class in the earlier suit shared a "sole
and common interest"). See also Shutts, 472 US at 811-12 (stating that absent plaintiffs may be
subject to the jurisdiction of a state court resolving their claims provided that minimal procedural due process protections are in place).
46 As Professor Samuel Issacharoff explains, adequate representation means that the absent class member has virtually participated in a fundamentally fair way. See Samuel C. Issacharoff, Governance andLegitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 S Ct Rev 337, 353.
47
See, for example, id at 385. Professor John Coffee argues that minimizing agency costs
legitimates representative litigation. In a sense he adds his voice to this claim. But Coffee emphasizes enhanced rights of "exit," that is, opt-out rights, as a key to lowered agency costs For
him, enhanced client autonomy becomes the linchpin for class action governance. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation,100 Colum L Rev 370, 437-38 (2000). For Nagareda's disagreement with Professors
Issacharoff and Coffee on this issue, see Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort ClassAction, 115 Harv L Rev 747, 785-89 (2002) (arguing that Professors
Issacharoff and Coffee do not account for the dynamics that produce settlement but involve
45

conflicts of interest).

20081

Some Realism about Mass Torts

1963

claimants better to enrich themselves. A conflict of interest between
present and future claimants, capitalized on by defendants, fueled the
incentives of the parties in Amchem and Ortiz to try for a global peace
and determined the structure the settlement took. The Court's insistence that cohesion could lead to better results for future claimants is
chimerical; it would mean no settlement at all. As Nagareda concludes,
"The upshot of Amchem and Ortiz, in practical terms, is that class settlements involving a purely prospective replacement of the tort system
simply are not viable ... at the invitation of any law firm realistically
positioned to serve as class counsel" (p 91).
The Court's litigation-centered ideal of due process is an unrealistic touchstone for peacemaking governance. This ideal demands respect for an individual's autonomy before someone acting on her behalf can abridge or modify her right to sue. 8 Sheer numbers make individual client consent a nonstarter for peacemaking on a mass scale.
Conflict-free cohesion can act as a substitute, but as a precondition for
peacemaking it conflicts with the dynamics that fuel peacemaking efforts in the first place.
Reinforcing a recurring theme in his book, Nagareda hints that an
answer to this dilemma lies in administration, not litigation. He observes that elections, for example, enable representatives legitimately to
govern constituents with far more conflicts and far less cohesion than
what Rule 23 after Amchem and Ortiz requires (p 89). An agency can
govern legitimately because this mechanism aligns over time the interests of administrators with the interests of the governed (pp 235-36). Just
as administration replaces litigation as lawsuits give way to settlements, litigation-centered ideals of legitimacy should yield to those
that authorize agencies to alter preexisting rights with binding rules.
As I discuss in Part II, I dispute Nagareda's point of departure, the
notion of preexisting rights and the limits they place on peacemaking.
My disagreement aside, his analysis of Amchem and Ortiz leads to a
useful framework for the assessment of mass tort settlements and the
legitimacy of peacemaking efforts.
C.

The Search for Peace

In Part III, Nagareda dissects each of the most significant efforts
to resolve mass torts over the past decade. These examples show how
the dynamics of mass tort litigation can clash with strictures of governance to hamstring peacemaking. Space does not permit a summary
that would do Nagareda's lucid commentary justice. I describe two of
48 See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 Tex L
Rev 287,295 (2003).
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his examples: the failed effort to resolve litigation against the pharmaceutical company Wyeth over the diet drug combination fen-phen, and
the unsuccessful attempt to settle cases against Sulzer Orthopedics for
its manufacture of defective hip implants. Their juxtaposition highlights a central peacemaking dilemma. Peacemaking efforts that leave
open avenues to tort, as happened in the fen-phen litigation, are legitimate, but they tend to unravel. As the Sulzer example shows, peacemaking efforts that totally replace rights to sue in tort with a compensation regime can stick but fail on legitimacy grounds. Chilled by an
unrealistic ideal of governance from Amchem and Ortiz, litigation has
proven an inhospitable clime for the final resolution of mass torts.
1. Fen-phen.
The fen-phen debacle began when thousands of plaintiffs sued
Wyeth, alleging that the drug combination it manufactured contributed
to a heart condition that could progress to severe heart disease. 9 Wyeth
sought peace after early losses in individual cases foretold a grim future
of huge plaintiffs' verdicts, replete with sizeable punitive damage
awards to punish the company for suppressing information about fenphen's dangers."0 The settlement class included presently impaired and
exposed-but-unimpaired claimants alike, and the settlement created a
compensation grid that generated payouts without requiring individual
claimants to prove causation (pp 137-38). It also provided for "backend opt-out rights." Class members could opt out of the settlement
within the usual short time Rule 23(e) provides." Presently unimpaired claimants could additionally opt out either upon diagnosis of a2
mild heart abnormality or upon diagnosis of a severe heart condition.1
Future claimants could thereby hedge against the risk that the claims
process would pay less than the expected value of a lawsuit once their
tort claims ripened. Nagareda describes these back-end opt-out rights
as "put options." A future claimant could force Wyeth to buy her right
to sue at a price set in the settlement (p 140). Alternatively, the claimant
49 See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine,Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability
Litigation, 2000 WL 1222042, *2-3 (ED Pa) (discussing the history of fen-phen's adverse health
effects, its withdrawal from the market, and the ensuing litigation). As Nagareda notes, at the
time of initial proceedings in the case, fen-phen's manufacturer was known as American Home
Products (p 136).
50
See generally Alison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and
Suggestions of Fraud Have Made Fen-phen a Disaster of a Mass Tort, The American Lawyer 92
(Mar 2005).
51 Although Rule 23(e) does not specify the length of an opt-out period for (b)(3) class,
deadlines as short as one month have been approved. See Carlough v Amchem Products,Inc, 158
FRD 314,329 (ED Pa 1983).
In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042 at *26.
52
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could eschew her option, opt out of the class, and test her luck in an

individual tort action (p 142). There was only one catch. Those who
opted out at the back end could not seek punitive damages-the quid

pro quo, Nagareda suggests, for the put option (pp 140-43).
The back-end opt-out rights solved the legitimacy problem that derailed the class settlements in Amchem and Ortiz by preserving the tort

system and thus each class member's autonomy over her right to sue
(p 143). The foregone punitive damages give Nagareda little pause. Class
counsel do not have unchecked power to alter absent class members'

preexisting rights. But individual plaintiffs have no right to punitive damages; they are only an "incidental vehicle to advance broader goals," and
plaintiffs receive them, if at all, as a windfall (p 142). Thus, Nagareda
contends, the settlement did not entail the sort of law reform that raises
problems of governance because it left preexisting rights intact." On
the other hand, the elimination of punitive damages going forward
benefited Wyeth significantly, as it could nip a future of uncertain and

potentially ruinous litigation in the bud (p 141). If not global peace
simpliciter, the fen-phen settlement at least cabined Wyeth's exposure
within acceptable limits while resting on a solidly legitimate foundation.
Nagareda's early enthusiasm for the fen-phen settlement as a model
143).'4
for peacemaking has, by his own admission, proven unfounded (p
As time passed, a "Field of Dreams" problem swamped the settlement: if

you build it (a compensation grid), they (claimants, many of whom either would never have pursued a claim or had a weak claim suddenly
worth something) will come (pp 143, 147). Abetted by suspect diagnos-

es, a flood of claimants wildly in excess of what Wyeth projected overwhelmed the $3.55 billion pledge to fund the settlement (pp 145-46)."
53 This discussion of punitive damages reflects some slippage in the way Nagareda uses the
concept of preexisting rights. "Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages when a tort has
been committed upon them," he argues, "but they have no entitlement to an award of punitive
damages" (p 142). True, but absent a class action settlement, fen-phen claimants would have a
preexisting right to seek punitive damages, regardless of whether they are entitled to them. The
implication of Nagareda's argument is that class counsel can bargain away absent class members'
rights to seek punitive damages without engaging in the sort of law reform that triggers a legitimacy problem. Atmospherically, this conflicts with the central goal of a lot of tort reformers-to
limit or do away with plaintiffs' rights to seek punitive damages. See, for example, the American
Tort Reform Association's position on punitive damages, Punitive Damages Reform, online at
http://www.atra.org/show/7343 (visited Aug 29, 2008). As a theoretical matter, trades of punitive
damages do affect preexisting rights, because the underlying substantive law, unaffected by the
class action, would afford them the right to seek punitive damages, if not an entitlement to them.
54 See Nagareda, 115 Harv L Rev at 797 (cited in note 47).
55 Two problems helped contribute to the settlement's downfall. First, Wyeth, fearful of
crushing jury awards, settled "pell-mell" an initial spate of opt-out claims without putting up
much of a defense. See Frankel, The American Lawyer at 96 (cited in note 50). This behavior
signaled to plaintiffs (and plaintiffs' lawyers) that there was easy money to be had. Many more
claimants than had been anticipated sought compensation from the settlement. Second, and
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The option price-the compensation regime's payout to a particular
claimant-had to fall, and administration of the claims process ground
to a halt. The opportunity cost for opt-outs plummeted. Even as
Wyeth desperately poured additional funds into the settlement to dissuade high-value claimants from opting out, tens of thousands of claimants chose their own tort suits rather than collect from the desiccated
compensation regime (p 147). In the end, the parties reworked their
deal to cut out back-end opt-out rights (p 146). The whole misadventure has cost Wyeth at least $21 billion (p 147).
Nagareda draws from the fen-phen disaster a "larger lesson"
about back-end opt-outs specifically and individual autonomy in mass
torts more generally: "Any private administrative regime that does not
foreclose resort to the tort system in relatively short order ... carries a
serious potential for instability" (p 147). The preservation of claimants'
autonomy legitimated the fen-phen settlement, but this legitimacy butted heads with practicalities that made the open-ended settlement too
unstable to achieve global peace.
2. Sulzer.
The Sulzer hip replacement settlement is the Scylla to fen-phen's
Charybdis. Sulzer faced two types of possible claimants: those who only
needed a medical exam to confirm that their defectively designed hip
implants did not warrant corrective surgery, and those who did in fact
need surgery (p 152). The parties designed their settlement to discourage
opt-outs and thereby ensure that high-value claimants recovered from a
predictable compensation grid, not a wildcat tort system. The settlement
included a lien that the peacemakers placed on most of Sulzer's net
worth. The lien would stay in place until Sulzer had paid all claims under
the settlement, or about six years. Sulzer could sell its assets for business
purposes, but the lien prohibited Sulzer from funding any judgments or
settlements that opt-outs might obtain (p 153). Opt-outs would thus
have to wait at least six years for their money, with the chance that the
settlement would exhaust Sulzer's assets in the meanwhile (p 153).
The lien would have solved the opt-out problem that unraveled
the fen-phen settlement. By increasing the costs of opting out, it would
have kept claimants in the class and thus won peace for Sulzer by capping its liability to a known, acceptable level (p 157). Unlike the waived
punitive damages in the fen-phen litigation, however, Nagareda believes that the second-class treatment the Sulzer lien offered opt-outs
relatedly, Wyeth allowed claimants to present diagnoses from their own doctors when they
claimed against the settlement. Many claimants obtained spurious diagnoses that overstated or
fabricated their injuries. Id at 96-97, 99. For a general discussion of the debacle, see id.
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amounted to law reform. Absent the class settlement, no claimant would
have a prior claim to any Sulzer's assets; all would begin the race toward satisfaction of judgments or settlements from the same starting line
(p 154). The lien affected preexisting rights because it changed the "rules
of the race" by altering claimants' positions vis-A-vis each other (p 156).
Amchem and Ortiz provide that a class settlement cannot generate its
own law reform power and that the certification requirements in Rule 23
limit the exercise of this power." The settlement produced the lien,
which is not provided for by Rule 23 but which altered preexisting rights.
The lien's "self-referential legitimacy" - that is, its origins in the settlement itself-suffered from the same "fatal circularity" and thus deficit of
legitimacy that marred the settlements in Ortiz and Amchem (p 156).
Nagareda uses examples from bankruptcy, government litigation,
and elsewhere to illuminate how present claimants hold all the cards
in peacemaking and can best win some form of compensation for future claimants but likely do so in a way that favors their own interests.57
His discussions of efforts to make peace through informal arrangements between powerful plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants and legislative solutions to mass torts convincingly expose the dilemma of peacemaking through litigation: the source of legitimacy for these efforts, as
fixed by litigation-centered due process ideals, can pose an insuperable obstacle to achievement of the practical needs for global peace.
D. Peacemaking as Governance
1. The leveraging proposal.
A straightforward message lurks beneath the course Nagareda
maps in his first three parts: traditional litigation has failed as an avenue for global peace in mass torts. Peacemaking is law reform because
it is governance. Peacemakers replace claimants' preexisting rights to
sue in tort with an administrative compensation regime of their own
devise -a set of rules to bind future claimants. Peacemaking incentives
require that this be so. Defendants need to reduce variance of outcomes
and cap their liability within acceptable bounds in order to leave tort

56 See Amchem, 527 US at 628-29 (observing that the adoption of a nationwide administrative
claims processing regime is a decision for Congress); Ortiz, 521 US at 861 ("The nub of our position
is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and that we are not
free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.").
57
Nagareda's chapter on bankruptcy, too detailed to adequately summarize here, is particularly trenchant. This analysis fits § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, a specific provision for asbestos companies into the framework established by Amchem and Ortiz. See 11 USC § 524(g)
(2000). Nagareda shows how claims resolution in bankruptcy suffers from the same set of problems that beset mass tort litigation (p 228).
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behind. Plaintiffs' lawyers with inventories of present claimants can
leverage the credible threat of significant recoveries to obtain a settlement for future claimants as well. This intersection of incentives
gives rise to efforts to resolve mass torts in a global fashion.
Litigation-centered requirements for legitimate governance, however, prove ill-fitting. Respect for individual autonomy as manifested in a
consensual attorney-client relationship -what legitimates settlements
of individual actions-makes little sense when global peace requires
that a compensation grid bind masses of future claimants, individuals
with no reason yet to have counsel. Conflict-free cohesion, the class
action substitute for a consensual attorney-client relationship, clashes
with the fact that defendants only settle future claims because of the
threat posed by plaintiffs' lawyers' stockpiled present claims. Within
the limits of Amchem and Ortiz, settlements have foundered on the
shoals of a practical inability to bind future claimants (fen-phen) or a
deficit of rulemaking legitimacy (Sulzer).
A paradigm shift is in order. As Nagareda observes, in mass torts,
"litigation operates as the prelude to administration" (p 220). Accordingly, principles of governance should stop "pound[ing] the square
peg of mass torts into the round hole of litigation concepts" and "instead ... reshape the hole itself' (p 221). Agencies can promulgate

rules with future power, even though they affect preexisting rights,
because agencies fit into an "an institutional structure that links the
self-interest of the rule makers with the well-being of the rule subjects" (p 235). Governance by public rulemaking passes a due process
test of legitimacy because an institutional arrangement "extends over
time the relationship between rule makers and rule subjects" (p 235)
(emphasis omitted). Administrators will pay the price, presumably in
terms of bad election outcomes for their administration, if they do a
bad job on behalf of those they represent.
Nagareda proposes an institutional arrangement-his "leveraging
proposal"-to inject this alternative due process ideal into mass tort
settlements. Rather than scrupulously avoid conflicts, his proposal
enables plaintiffs' counsel to leverage high-value present claimants to
win a peace on behalf of all present and future claimants' To protect
against the sort of unequal allocations that marred the settlements in
58 The originality of Nagareda's proposal is striking in light of the received wisdom that
peacemaking attorneys should not represent both present and future claimants. See, for example,
Dennis E. Curtis and Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts:Access, Risk, and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47
DePaul L Rev 425,443-44 (1998). For a comprehensive review of fee arrangements in mass torts
and other aggregate litigation, see generally Judith Resnik, et al, Individuals within the Aggregate:
Relationships; Representation,and Fees, 71 NYU L Rev 296 (1996).
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Amchem and Ortiz, a fee arrangement would ensure that these lawyers internalize the risk that the settlement does not treat present and
future claimants equivalently. Plaintiffs' lawyers would earn a contingency fee equal to a fixed percentage of the lesser of what a present
claimant receives or what a similarly situated future claimant receives
when she eventually files her claim (p 237). The funds reserved under
the settlement for fees would go into something like an escrow account for a specified period of years, long enough for a court to evaluate how equally the settlement treats present and future claimants.
This arrangement would govern both peacemaking lawyers, that is,
those who design the settlement, and lawyers who represent individual claimants to the settlement (p 240).
Nagareda's leveraging proposal can solve many of the peacemaking problems he identifies in the book. First, unlike Amchem and Ortiz, his arrangement credits the dynamics that drive peacemaking,
which include conflicts of interest, but harnesses them to ensure that
they operate legitimately. Nagareda rejects a blind reliance on a litigation-centered ideal of legitimacy that does not work in practice. Second,
whereas plaintiffs' lawyers already have an incentive to do well by
present claimants - their clients and thus their source of fees - the leveraging proposal ensures that they have an equal incentive to do well
by future claimants. Third, the arrangement protects against the "Field
of Dreams" problem-a deluge of specious claims that swamps a settlement fund-by penalizing lawyers if they exhaust a fund for present
claimants and leave only scraps on the table for the future. Fourth, the
leveraging proposal will lead to a maximally large settlement. It precludes a "take the money and run" problem, by which defendants can
buy off plaintiffs' counsel cheaply with a settlement that makes large
upfront payouts but provides little for the future. Also, plaintiffs' lawyers will demand a larger overall pie to compensate them for the risk
of future settlement shortfalls. The proposal thereby maximizes total
recovery. Finally, the proposal provides a "first-party, bottom-up" mechanism to police the maturity boundary. Plaintiffs' lawyers will not
want to settle until they can accurately predict the number and value
of future claimants. This waiting period will equal the time necessary
for a mass tort to mature, which will happen organically and without
the need for judicial shepherding.
One problem remains. Plaintiffs' lawyers will come to the settlement
with existing fee agreements entered into with clients. Nagareda maintains that courts generally lack the power to set aside these contracts,
especially since doing so may well result in lower payouts to present
claimants, the lawyer's clients (p 252). Hence he proposes a turn to
rulemaking, not just as a model for legitimate governance but actually
to implement the leveraging proposal. Parties would work out a set-
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tlement in conjunction with the requisite government agency, which
would be empowered by legislation to be involved, as part of a negotiated rulemaking proceeding.59 The final rule would include the fee
arrangement Nagareda proposes. As a quid pro quo for participation
in the rulemaking enterprise, the parties would benefit from a settlement adopted as a public rule and thus binding on all claimants going
forward (pp 254, 261). In other words, once the rule became final, no
one could opt out.
2. Reactions.
I will leave to others an administrative law critique of the rulemaking aspect of Nagareda's leveraging proposal. His solution to the
legitimacy problem in mass torts has an appealingly simple elegance
to it, all the more so given how complicated and problematic global
peace in mass torts can be. I nonetheless offer one theoretical and one
practical critique.
a) Administration and autonomy. At the theoretical level, the pa-

radigm shift from the litigation-centered ideal of legitimacy to an administrative one may not be necessary. Nagareda elsewhere has derided
the "Maginot Line" mentality that hinges the legitimacy of a mass tort
settlement on satisfaction of a litigation-centered due process ideal."'
This mindset ignores "the new world of warfare" in mass torts that has
"blitzed past" old models of dispute resolution." Conflict-free cohesion
as a substitute for individual autonomy ignores mass tort realities. Legitimate governance better suited to the challenges mass torts pose
draws inspiration from administration, not litigation, as the appropriate institutional framework.
However, the source of legitimacy Nagareda invokes-an alignment of incentives between those who make rules and those affected by
them-arguably fits within a litigation framework. As discussed, the
class action's due process bona fides rest on a foundation of valid interest representation. A number of scholars have argued that a class action
59
In a negotiated rulemaking proceeding, an agency determines that there exists a limited
number of interests that will be affected by a proposed rule. It then creates a committee, which
includes representatives from these interests as well as agency representatives, to craft a rule by
consensus. The rule then goes through standard rulemaking procedures before it becomes final
(pp 255-57). For negotiated rulemaking in the mass tort setting, Nagareda proposes that the agency
that usually attends to the subject matter of the mass tort at issue appoint the peacemaking lawyers
to the rulemaking committee and promulgate the settlement they strike as the rule (pp 257-65).
60 See Richard A. Nagareda, Panel Discussion, The Vioxx Settlement (American Enterprise
Institute Jan 7, 2008), online at http://www.aei.orglevents/filter.all,eventlD.1626/event-detail.asp
(visited Aug 29, 2008). See also Adam Liptak, In Vioxx Settlement, Testing a Legal Ideal: A Lawyer's Loyalty, NY Times A12 (Jan 22, 2008) (quoting Nagareda).
61 Nagareda, Panel Discussion, The Vioxx Settlement (cited in note 60).
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can bind absent class members without their consent to a judgment or

settlement consistent with constitutional prerequisites if the class representative and the class counsel adequately represent their interests.62

The flaw with the extant standard for interest representation, conflictfree cohesion, is that it ignores the dynamics of settlement and thus demands the impossible. Nagareda proposes a tool that may achieve valid
interest representation in a manner consistent with settlement realities.
Described as such, Nagareda's proposal fits rather than rejects the
existing due process paradigm for aggregate litigation.

Nagareda invokes standard requirements of professional responsibility, which preclude the representation of conflicting interests absent client consent, to justify a turn away from litigation (pp 228-29).
But these requirements regulate litigation involving relationships based

on autonomy and consent, that is, individual attorney-client relationships. They do not apply, or at least not neatly, in class actions. An ill
fit between rules of professional responsibility and Nagareda's leveraging proposal does not make litigation the wrong paradigm for mass
torts, because class actions offer a version of this institutional framework where these rules apply imperfectly, if at all.
Current class action law (as opposed to law of professional responsibility) may well place "off limits," as Nagareda contends, an arrangement "in which the dealmakers on the plaintiffs' side simulta62
See, for example, Issacharoff, 1999 S Ct Rev at 341,352 (cited in note 46); John Bronsteen
and Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 1419, 1420 (2003); Marjorie A. Silver,
Fairness and Finality: Third-party Challenges to Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees after
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 62 Fordham L Rev 321,367 (1993); Owen Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L Rev 965,970-71 (1993). See also Douglas Laycock, Due Processof Law in Trilateral
Disputes, 78 Iowa L Rev 1011, 1020 (1993) (referring to interest representation as a "second best"
due process alternative); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 NYU L Rev 193, 214 (1992) (referring to this as the "conventional wisdom"). Professor
Coffee effectively posits good interest representation as the due process prerequisite for aggregate
litigation. He does so, however, by emphasizing client autonomy. Strengthening client autonomy
with rigorous opt out rights, he argues, will minimize the sort of agency costs that make interest
representation problematic. See Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 417-28 (cited in note 47).
63 See, for example, Bash v FirstmarkStandardLife InsuranceCo, 861 F2d 159,161 (7th Cir
1988) (recognizing that strictly mandating rules of conduct on attorneys may make class actions
unworkable); FRCP 23(g)(1)(B), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments (recognizing a possible conflict between class representatives and the class and requiring class counsel
to put "the best interests of the class as a whole" first); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 comment 25 (2003) (noting that unnamed members in a class action are not considered clients of the lawyer with regard to whether "the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client" under Rule 1.7). By implication, Nagareda might suggest that
the standard conflict of interest rules do not apply in class litigation because "substantial conflicts are not allowed to emerge in the first place" under current class certification law (p 229).
"Substantial conflicts" among class members, and between clients and their lawyers, do in fact
emerge in class actions without requiring decertification of classes. See generally, for example,
Lazy Oil Co v Witco Corp, 166 F3d 581 (3d Cir 1999).
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neously represent both persons with present-day disease and persons
at risk of disease in the future" (p 227). Thus, even if the class action
framework and its foundation in interest representation could mesh in
theory with Nagareda's prescription, its current contours make it illsuited for a mechanism that leverages rather than avoids conflicts of
interest. One could simply criticize the Court in Amchem and Ortiz
for misunderstanding how conflicts of interest in mass tort work and
for failing to appreciate that management of the conflicts, not their repudiation, could lead to the best form of interest representation. Keeping mass torts in the litigation paradigm would thus require a revision
to class action law. But a revision to one paradigm may come more
easily than its wholesale replacement with another.
If a paradigm shift is necessary, it may be because valid interest representation alone cannot function as a complete due process substitute
for the consensual attorney-client relationship and the respect it affords
individual autonomy. For damages class actions, the extent to which due
process requires some residue of participatory rights for class members
remains uncertain.6' Nagareda treats Amchem as consistent with the
notion that valid interest representation is a sufficient due process substitute (p 229). But the opinion is ambiguous on this point. After it pronounced the class dead on conflict-of-interest grounds, the Court mentioned in dicta an additional concern, that the settlement did not afford
61
absent class members meaningful opt-out rights. Similarly, in Ortiz, the
Court rejected the parties' expansive use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in part
because it would have bound class members without affording them
opt-out rights and thus "regardless ... of their consent."''
If individual autonomy is an irreducible due process minimum and
if, as Nagareda suggests, opt-out rights imperil global peace, then perhaps peacemaking does in fact require a paradigm shift to administration, where some form of participatory rights is not a prerequisite for
legitimate governance. Nagareda could have justified his turn to agency
rulemaking, for example, not because it is necessary to override individual professional services agreements but because a promulgated rule
could displace claimants' autonomy to control their rights to sue without affording opt-out rights. But Nagareda seems to agree that valid

64
See, for example, Robert G. Bone, Personaland Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation,70 BU L Rev 213, 225-26 (1990) (describing the
Advisory Committee's shifting positions on whether absent class members must consent to representation); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 252
(Yale 1987) (arguing that Rule 23(b) vacillates between entrusting class representatives with the
interests of those represented and requiring the consent of those represented).
65 Amchem, 521 US at 628.
66
See Ortiz, 527 US at 847.

2008]

Some Realism about Mass Torts

1973

interest representation is all that is needed." Importantly, he notes that
a final rule adopting a settlement would bind all claimants to its terms,

whether they liked it or not, but he does not identify this outcome as a
linchpin for the legitimacy of the process. If this is so, the paradigm
shift to administration does not seem necessary as the theoretical pre-

requisite for the leveraging proposal.
b) Practicalproblems with the leveraging proposal. As a practical

matter, Nagareda's leveraging proposal-the fee arrangement that
defers payment to plaintiffs' lawyers until future claimants make their
claims -would lead to significant delay, both for the final approval of

mass tort settlements and the distribution of attorneys' fees. My argument should be kept in perspective, as fee awards in class actions

can take a notoriously long time to vest in plaintiffs' lawyers. Fen-phen
is illustrative. The district court approved the settlement in 2000, but the
until 2008. 6
plaintiffs' lawyers did not get their fee award in whole
Nonetheless, the agency overlay, added to the leveraging propos-

al, would lengthen an already protracted enterprise. With judicial review in the offing, rulemaking, including the supposedly more streamlined negotiated variety, hardly enjoys a sterling reputation as an efficient enterprise.6 Nagareda would add to the lengthy mass tort matu-

ration process a potentially thick layer of administrative delay. After a
mass tort labored through a long immaturity stretch, and after peace67
Nagareda suggests that opt-out rights are best understood not as a testament to the
continued importance of individual autonomy in representative litigation but as a means better
to ensure good interest representation (p 136). Past writing expands on this idea. Nagareda has
argued that "[t]he proposition that class counsel have no general mandate to alter preexisting
rights.., means that the holders of those rights generally must have the opportunity to exclude
themselves from the transaction" by enjoying the right to opt out. Richard A. Nagareda, The
Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 Colum L Rev 149, 195 (2003). Respect for autonomy is not an end unto itselt however. Rather, the threat of opt-outs by high value
claimants will ensure that class counsel and defendants, interested in a final peace, will craft a
settlement that will maximize the interests of all class members and thereby make opting out an
unattractive option. See id at 196. See also Nagareda, 115 Harv L Rev at 829 (cited in note 47)
(praising opt-out rights as a means to "respect individual autonomy by preserving the tort system
as an ongoing check on the settlement terms").
68 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation, 2008 WL 942592, *2, *43-46 (ED Pa). The court made several preliminary fee awards
during these eight years. See id at *6.
69 See, for example, Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L Rev 1, 9 n 19 (1997) (noting a consensus that rulemaking is costly, rigid, and has spurred
perverse incentives). For empirical evidence suggesting that negotiated rulemaking has not proven
markedly more efficient than standard rulemaking, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy
of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 NYU Envir L J 386 (2001); Charles C.
Caldart and Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 Harv Envir L Rev 141, 145 (1999); Cary
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
Duke L J 1255,1260-61,1271-1309 (1997).
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makers concluded complex and difficult settlement negotiations, the
agency would then have to open a notice and comment period before it
could promulgate a final rule to adopt a settlement. One study of comment periods discovered that on average they lasted 2.2 years.70 Objectors to the settlement could lodge their disagreement before the rule's
final publication; but even more ominously, they could then sue to challenge the promulgated settlement as arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act7' (APA). Given the likelihood of objectors in high-stakes class actions,72 such challenges are sure bets. A whole
new round of litigation would have to end before claimants could start
receiving compensation.
As for plaintiffs' lawyers waiting to be paid, Nagareda would add
to this time a three- to five-year period while their fees sit in escrow. Even
assuming a settlement took one year to proceed from proposed to final
rule, objectors to the final product would then have whatever the number of years the applicable statute of limitations provided within which
to sue. The APA prescribes a six-year period.73 Nagareda notes that agency participation in his leveraging proposal would require legislation; any
workable legislative scheme would have to include a much shorter limitations period. Unless Congress provided exclusive jurisdiction for such
challenges, as Nagareda proposes (p 265), a case could begin in any federal district, go to the appellate level, and only end when the Supreme
Court denied certiorari or decided the case on the merits. A best-case
estimate for the length of this litigation is approximately two years. At
the outer extreme (assuming the APA's limitations period remains in
place), plaintiffs' attorneys could have to wait up to fourteen years before they got their fees: nine years for rulemaking and related litigation
to conclude, then another five while the leveraging proposal kicked in.
This scenario is the worst case, and Nagareda has built into his proposal
a number of ways to shorten the process. But even a significantly more
expedited process would likely mean quite a long waiting period.
Delay would create several problems. First, for mass torts, where
claimants may suffer from serious physical infirmities, justice delayed

70 See William F West, Formal Procedures, Informal Process4 Accountability,and Responsiveness in BureaucraticPolicy Making:An InstitutionalPolicy Analysis, 64 Pub Admin Rev 66,69 (2004).
71 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (2000).
72 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoreticaland EmpiricalIssues, 57 Vand L Rev 1529, 1555 (2004) (observing
that the number of objectors rises as the value of the case rises).
73
See 28 USC § 2401(a); Wind River Mining Corp v United States, 946 F2d 710,712-13 (9th
Cir 1991) (holding that 28 USC § 2401(a) applies to actions brought under the APA to challenge
agency action).
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may well be justice denied." Second, nothing in the fee arrangement
Nagareda describes addresses the problem of high-value opt-outs. Some
plaintiffs' lawyers might encourage their high-value, presently impaired
clients to opt out of the aggregate settlement before its adoption as a
rule, so the clients' recoveries are not lessened by a need to fund future
claimants adequately and so the lawyer can get fees more quickly." A
sufficiently large number of high-value opt-outs could doom the negotiated settlement, as defendants would not have much incentive to fund
a compensation grid that does not bind the sort of ruinous and risky
claimants that drove it to settlement in the first place. Once the agency
adopts the settlement as a final rule, it can of course extinguish opt-out
rights. But the delay engendered by the rulemaking process might afford opt-outs sufficient time to threaten the settlement's viability.
Third, only highly capitalized plaintiffs' firms, with ample resources
at their disposal to enable them to sit out this period, could play in the
mass tort game. Nagareda quite correctly observes that mass torts are
already very much the province of the Lieff Cabrasers and Cohen Milsteins of the plaintiffs' bar (p 257). Mass torts require huge upfront investments by plaintiffs' firms. Moreover, one or several of the few
large-scale plaintiffs' firms typically wins appointment to the plaintiffs' steering committee in multidistrict litigation. This result is appropriate. Given the financial resources corporate defendants have at the
ready, a system that levels the playing field by allowing only the plaintiffs' A-team and their resources into the contest makes sense.
Still, Nagareda may overestimate the capacity even of elite plaintiffs' firms to weather a lengthy delay before they get their fees. These
firms diversify their portfolios of cases and perhaps can tide themSelves over with fees eard..from antitrust, securities, and other complex litigation that pays in the present. But likely winnings for plaintiffs' lawyers are notoriously illiquid assets. The leveraging proposal
makes a hardly implausible doomsday scenario more likely: a firm has
millions invested in pending cases, cannot access its mass tort fees, and
74
See, for example, Ortiz, 527 US at 866 (Breyer dissenting) (observing that "in one 3,000member asbestos class action ... 448 of the original class members had died while the litigation
was pending").
75 If an existing multidistrict litigation order is in place, any opt-out suit initiated in a federal court would be sent to the court that presides over the settlement, empowering the court
designated for multidistrict litigation to make sure that these opt-out cases do not unravel the
settlement itself. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 199
FRD 425, 435 (2001) (authorizing, pursuant to Rule 7.4, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer "tag-along" actions to the MDL transferee court). But opt-outs could file suit
in state courts, and it is doubtful that the MDL judge in the federal litigation could enjoin them
from doing so. See, for example, Dretles v MetropolitanLife Insurance Co, 357 F3d 344,347 (3d Cir
2003) (refusing to use the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin opt-outs from a class settlement from
suing elsewhere, and distinguishing cases where courts granted such an injunction).
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does not have sufficient capital to pay its operating costs in the
present.7 6 Moreover, Nagareda's proposal increases the opportunity
cost of litigating mass torts significantly. To do so means that plaintiffs'
firms would give up potentially lucrative litigation whose payday arrives sooner than a mass tort payday would. Top firms might turn
away from mass torts as a result. New firms could fill the void, but the
startup capital necessary to litigate a mass tort, compounded by the
prospect of attorney compensation delayed for years after a settlement, could make market entry quite difficult and perilous.
II. NAGAREDA'S FORMALISM

-PREEXISTING

RIGHTS TO SUE

Mass tort settlements pose problems of governance because they
involve a sort of privatized law reform. As Nagareda sees it, claimants
enjoy rights to sue in tort that preexist litigation commenced by
would-be peacemakers. These rights to sue are property rights. When
they settle mass torts, plaintiffs' lawyers sell these preexisting property
rights to the defendant and thereby replace the tort system with an
alternative compensation regime. Most claimants -either absent class
members or future claimants-do not consent to representation by
the peacemaking plaintiffs' counsel. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the
power that peacemaking lawyers assume to dispose of others' property rights is uncertain. A source of legitimacy that does not undermine
the pragmatics of peacemaking leads Nagareda to his leveraging proposal. It makes the sale legitimate because it aligns the interests of the
peacemakers with the interests of all claimants, present and future. This
proposal, Nagareda maintains, requires agency rulemaking to override
existing attorney-client contracts. Nagareda's turn to agency rulemaking thus starts with the notion of preexisting rights to sue in tort.
In this Part, I question Nagareda's point of departure, which I believe strikes a formalist note in an otherwise consistently realist account.
In my view, individuals do not enjoy rights to sue as property rights in
any real sense unless these rights come with a viable procedural avenue
for their attempted vindication. I distinguish rights to sue that have no
procedural avenue for their attempted vindication from those that do,
76
Nagareda suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers could securitize expected future fees and thereby
earn shortly after settlement at least some of what they would otherwise have to wait three to
five years to earn (p 239). Two features of mass tort litigation that Nagareda himself describes
lead me to question this proposal's efficacy. First, how mass tort settlements play out, in terms of
the numbers of future claimants who end up filing claims and whether the settlement amount is
sufficient to pay these claims, is notoriously difficult to predict. Nagareda's description of the fenphen debacle is an example (pp 145-47). See also generally Frankel, The American Lawyer 92
(cited in note 50). Second, the specter of bankruptcy haunts mass tort defendants. The market for
these settlement securities might require a huge discount rate to compensate investors for uncertainty and the possibility of bankruptcy.
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and I contend that a number of litigation realities mean that the class
action device can often offer the only, or at least the superior, such procedural avenue. If correct, this observation adds normative support to the
entity theory of the class action, advanced primarily by David Shapiro,
which conceives of the class as more than the sum of its individual parts.
Although I depart from Nagareda's premise, I do so in the service
of his leveraging proposal. If the entity theory is correct, it justifies a
perspective on the class action that treats the class's interests as primary
and strengthens judicial power to put the leveraging proposal in place
without agency action.
A. Some Realism about Preexisting Rights to Sue
1. Formalism, realism, and rights to sue.
Nagareda does not explicitly define what he means by "preexisting rights to sue" (p 83), but his argument makes the phrase's meaning
clear. He refers to the bundle of rights claimants allegedly possess by
whatever underlying substantive law a particular case puts at issue."
This definition does not imply that a claimant has a right to compensation but rather a right that, if a claimant meets her evidentiary burden
for each element the substantive law prescribes, entitles the claimant
to some form of relief. Because preexisting rights are property rights,
class counsel cannot unilaterally usurp the power from individual
holders to sell their causes of action by way of a class action settlement. As Nagareda has written elsewhere, "[T]he class action must
take as given class members' preexisting bundle of rights." 78 Rule 23's
provenance in the Rules Enabling Act, and the Act's mandate that pro-

77 This definition fits Nagareda's discussion of judicial attempts to police the boundary between immature and mature torts, which are efforts to match settlement value with claimants' rights
afforded by underlying substantive law. It also fits Nagareda's discussion of Amchem, Ortiz, and the
Rules Enabling Act (pp 84, 87). See also Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law
after the Class Action FairnessAct, 74 UMKC L Rev 661, 662 (2006) (referring to "preexisting
rights" as those "delineated by substantive law"); Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 196 & n 205 (cited
in note 67) (referring to a "preexisting bundle of rights settled upon by public policymakers" and
referring to those "public policymakers" as legislators, administrators, and common law courts).
78 Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 174 (cited in note 67) (emphasis added). For other similar
arguments, see Martin H. Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Caseor-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U Chi L Rev 545,
551 (2006); Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance"to "Resolvability":A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 Vand L Rev 995, 1034-46 (2005); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation,Amplification, and Distortion,2003 U Chi Legal F 475,490 (2003).
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cedural rules not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right," 9
establish this limit as a matter of statutory and constitutional law.8°
The notion of preexisting rights to sue fixed by substantive law
and vested as such in individuals as property implies a formalist separa-

tion between substance and procedure." This premise-rights preexist
in substantive law-makes a jurisprudential assumption that at the
least is open to question. Expressing a sentiment shared by a number
of legal realists, Karl Llewellyn argued that "a right ...exists to the
extent that a likelihood exists that A can induce a court to squeeze, out
of B, A's damages ....
In this aspect substantive rights ... , as distinct
from adjective, simply disappear." If conceived of only as a product of

substantive law, a right to sue "means nothing," as it has no real-world
implications for a plaintiff, a defendant, or a court.83 To quote Llewellyn's folk wisdom, "If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride."'"

28 USC § 2072(b) (2000).
Id. Language in Amchem and Ortiz supports this reading of the statute. See Amchem,
521 US at 613 (recognizing that the interpretation of Rule 23 requirements must accord with
Article III and the Rules Enabling Act); Ortiz, 527 US at 845 (same). Nagareda elaborates on the
import of the Rules Enabling Act for preexisting rights elsewhere. See Nagareda, 103 Colum L
Rev at 189-91 (cited in note 67). This Review does not tackle the thorny issues posed by the
intersection of Rule 23 with the Rules Enabling Act. For additional discussion, see, for example,
Note, The Rules EnablingAct and the Limits of Rule 23, 111 Harv L Rev 2294,2307 (1998) (suggesting that the interpretation of Rule 23 in Amchem may have violated the Rules Enabling
Act); Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 Duke L J
281, 317-19 (discussing Rule 23's impact on doctrine understood as substantive law); Stephen B.
Burbank, Hold the Corks:A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L J 1012, 1027-28 (same).
81 There are two reasons for the term "formalist." First, the distinction between substance
and procedure arose during an era of legal thought when formal distinctions among legal conceptions took firm root. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand L Rev 1225, 1231 (2001)
(describing the late nineteenth century roots of the distinction between "substance" and "procedure"); Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodernto Modern American Jurisprudence:The Onset of
Positivism, 50 Vand L Rev 1387, 1411 (1997) (describing the antebellum relationship between
substance and procedure). Second, as discussed in this Review, legal realists reacted to the distinction between substance and procedure as a formalist idea. Id at 1433-38.
82 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 Colum L Rev 431, 448
(1930). For other prominent legal realists making a similar point, see Walter Wheeler Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L J 333, 336 (1933); Thurman W.
Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U Pa L Rev 811,819
(1936) ("The difference between substantive law and procedure is nothing but a difference in
attitude."). Compare Robert M. Cover, For James Wm.Moore:Some Reflections on a Reading of
the Rules, 84 Yale L J 718, 719-20 (1975) (reporting that Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing a generation before legal realism, shared a similar idea of the distinction between substance and procedure). For criticism of the Realists inthis respect, see Perry Dane, Vested Rights, 'Vestedness,' and
Choice of Law, 96 Yale L J 1191,1236-42 (1987).
83 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 18 (Oceana 1960).
84 Id (emphasis omitted).
79
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A realist perspective treats a procedural avenue for the attempted vindication of a right to sue as an essential component of the right itself.85
This perspective does not deny all utility to the labels "substance"
and "procedure" but makes them useful heuristics if not conceptually
distinct phenomena.6 The perspective insists that any line-drawing must
depend on the purpose for and context in which the line is being
drawn." Hardly jurisprudential ravings from a defunct era in legal
theory, this understanding of the substance/procedure dichotomy is
arguably a main stream one." Guided by Llewellyn's insight, I maintain that a rigid boundary between substance and procedure for the
purpose of identifying the components of a right to sue does not exist
if a right to sue is that which entitles its holder to attempt to require
her adversary to conform to a particular duty. Defined accordingly, a
right to sue is abstract and meaningless in any real-world sense if no
procedural avenue exists for its attempted vindication. Although I recognize that this understanding of a right to sue is hardly self-evident,"
my premise is that a right to sue has real content that matters to the
law only if such a procedural avenue exists.
By asserting the preexistence of a right to sue, Nagareda has sidestepped "the logical morass"" that obscures the boundary between substance and procedure. With a realist-inspired understanding of a right
to sue in mind, I propose an analytical distinction to peg with some
precision the ways in which substance and procedure interact to form
such a right. I label as "unrealized" those rights to sue that appear to
have substantive content but lack a procedural avenue for their attempted vindication, and as "realized" those that have both.
A couple of examples expose the epistemic limits of a right to sue
defined exclusively in substantive terms and the differencc between
unrealized and realized rights. A hypothetical paint company lands a
85 This perspective could also explain why fee-shifting provisions, treble damages, and
other mechanisms that enable realization should be thought of as part of the right to sue as well.
See Burbank, 106 Colum L Rev at 1937 (cited in note 15).
86 Compare Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 36 Cornell L Q 181,183 (1950) ("There is not
a sharp enough dichotomy between substance and procedure so that these terms can be rigorously self-applying in any event."), reviewing Charles T.McCormick and James H. Chadbourn,
Cases and Materialson FederalCourts (2d ed, Foundation Press 1950).
87
See Carrington, 1989 Duke L J at 284 (cited in note 80).
88 See, for example, Sun Oil Co v Wortman, 486 US 717, 726-27 (1988) ("Except at the
extremes, the terms 'substance' and 'procedure' precisely describe very little except a dichotomy,
and what they mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the
dichotomy is drawn.").
89 Compare Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness,and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L J 1277, 1285-91
(1989) (criticizing the realists' consequentialist concepts of rights). See also Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 Colum L Rev 857, 870-72 (1999) (describing
theories that reject the notion that rights depend in an existential sense on remedies).
90 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,392 (1989).
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government contract to provide paint for all on-base housing for mili-

tary families in the United States. The paint turns out to contain a harmful chemical that injures thousands of children. Parents file scores of
lawsuits in federal courts around the country. After deciding to consolidate the cases pursuant to 28 USC § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) has to decide where to send them for pretrial proceedings. 9' This decision will determine whether plaintiffs have
rights to sue. If the JPML sends the cases to a district court within the
Ninth Circuit, where the government contractor defense would not apply, the cases could survive a motion to dismiss.9 If cases go instead to a

court within the Eleventh Circuit, where the defense applies to make
defendants immune from suit, the plaintiffs' claims vanish. 3 The plaintiffs thus have an unrealized right to sue pending the JPML's decision
under § 1407 as to where to send the multidistrict litigation.

Arbitration agreements with class action waivers illustrate the
same idea. A contract between a seller and a consumer will set the
substantive terms of the agreement between them and thus the scope of
the consumer's right to recover in contract against the seller. Often the
contract will also include an arbitration agreement, and increasingly
these agreements include waivers that preclude consumers from bring-

ing or joining class actions.9 Courts almost assuredly would enforce the
clause to bar a consumer from filing an individual action. 6 Whether she
has any right to sue at all thus depends on whether she can start or join
a class action. If her case proceeds in the First Circuit, where such waivers are generally unenforceable,9 she has a right to sue. If it goes for-

91 28 USC § 1407(b) (2000).
92

See In re Hawaii FederalAsbestos Cases,960 F2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir 1992) (refusing to

extend the government contractor defense to providers of nonmilitary products).
93 See Burgess v Colorado Serum Co, Inc, 772 F2d 844, 846 (11th Cir 1985) (extending the
government contractor defense to providers of nonmilitary products). The Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits apply the law of the circuit in which the MDL transferee judge sits to dispositive motions. See Newton v Thomason, 22 F3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir 1994); Murphy v FDIC,208 F3d 959,
966 (11th Cir 2000).
94
It should be noted that Nagareda has criticized class action waivers elsewhere as efforts by
private contract essentially to engage in law reform. See Nagareda, 106 Colum L Rev at 1902-04
(cited in note 13).
95 See Jean R. Sternlight and Elizabeth J. Jensen, UsingArbitrationto Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: EfficientBusiness Practiceor UnconscionableAbuse?, 67 L & Contemp Probs 75,75 (2004).
96 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,Near-total Demise of the
Modem Class Action, 104 Mich L Rev 373, 393-96 (2005) (describing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on arbitration as "incredibly expansive").
97 See, for example, Kristian v Comcast Corp, 446 F3d 25,53-60 (1st Cir 2006) (refusing to
compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims because the arbitration agreement barred class and
consolidated actions).
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ward in the Seventh, where they are generally enforceable,' she has
none. Her right to sue cannot preexist in substantive law. Pending a determination as to whether she can establish venue and personal jurisdiction in the First Circuit, her right to sue remains unrealized.
2.

Class actions and realized rights to sue.

For the government contractor and arbitration agreement examples, an unrealized right to sue means that a procedural problem may
take away the plaintiff's power to attempt to vindicate any protection
the applicable substantive law might otherwise afford. The government contractor defense, for example, poses such an irreducible legal
infirmity. I go a step further and suggest that the gap between realized
and unrealized rights to sue may prove just as irreducible in real terms
when the holder has no ability to attempt to vindicate her claim. This
is so even if there exists no hard-and-fast legal infirmity in her way. In
many instances, one or a number of practical barriers, such as a deficit
of resources, may prevent or make difficult an attempted vindication
through the procedural avenue of an individual action. In some such
cases, the class action mechanism may provide the only, or perhaps the
superior, procedural avenue for the realization of a right to sue.
The class action mechanism often provides the only procedural
avenue for the attempted vindication of small or "negative value"
claims.9 Substantive law may vest holders with robust and unambiguous
rights and impose corresponding duties on prospective defendants. Unless the substantive law also provides something like a fee-shifting provision, however, these rights to sue lack real-world meaning absent the
class device. In Judge Posner's words, "only a lunatic or a fanatic"' '
would file an individual action based on them. Hence realization depends on the class action: "The realistic alternative to a class action is
not [ ] million[s] [of] individual suits, but zero individual suits.' '. °
Putting aside for argument's sake discomfort with my distinction
between realized and unrealized rights, the contention that class actions provide the only means to pursue many small value causes of

98 Metro East Centerfor Conditioning and Health v Q west Communications International,
Inc, 294 F3d 924, 927 (7th Cir 2002) (recognizing that an arbitration agreement is enforced to the
same extent as a contract).
99 By small value claims, I include both those claims that are small in economic terms as
well as those claims that lack sufficient noneconomic value to justify an individual action. A
claim for some type of injunctive relief that, although it has little economic value, nonetheless
has sufficient significance for the plaintiff to motivate her to bring a lawsuit does not qualify.
100 Carnegie v HouseholdInternational,Inc, 376 F3d 656,661 (7th Cir 2004).
101 Id. See also Blair v Equifax Check Services, Inc, 181 F3d 832,834 (7th Cir 1999).
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action should provoke little disagreement. ' Can one draw a bright-line
boundary between small value claims and high-value ones, and say with
confidence that rights to sue that fall on the high-value side do not need
the class action for realization? In past writing, Nagareda has suggested a "marketability" boundary.' 3 Perhaps mass torts generally involve high-value or "marketable" rights to sue, rendering academic (for
the purposes of this Review) any quibbling about realization.
For at least two reasons, procedural avenues and the way they do
or do not enable realization remain relevant for mass torts. First, a
claim's value may depend on its relationship to other claims. As Nagareda describes, what can make a mass tort truly mass is not a slew of
high-value claims but are rather some high-value claims that might be
realized on their own, plus a lot of less valuable claims (pp 21-23). The
latter can include exposure-only claims or claims marred by individual
causation problems. A seventy-five-year-old, overweight smoker who
believes that Vioxx caused his stroke might have a hard time finding a
lawyer, as litigation costs may exceed the client's expected recovery. If a
lawyer can add the smoker's claim to an inventory that includes a thirty-year-old athlete's claim, the lawyer can spread costs across cases and
thus assume the smoker's representation. The smoker's claim increases
in net value because of its relationship to the aggregate, which might
coalesce as a class. This is not necessarily to suggest that this increase in
value is desirable, just that it happens as a result of aggregation.
Second, the realist perspective gives reason to doubt the efficacy
of a bright-line marketability boundary. The line between rights to sue
realizable through individual actions and those needing class treatment
cannot be pinpointed without consideration of context, that is, the details of a particular case and perhaps even of particular claimants. In
some instances, case-specific characteristics, including litigation costs
and psychological dispositions of claimants and judges, can render even
claims with an abstractly high value unrealizable through individual
actions. Although not legal infirmities per se, these informal barriers
blur the marketability boundary. The following are just several of the
many informal ways in which even high-value claims can require a class
action (or some other form of aggregative proceeding) for realization.
As litigation costs increase, the likelihood that even a nominally
high-value right to sue is realizable through an individual action de-

102 See Amchem, 521 US at 617 ("The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism
is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights."), quoting Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp, 109
F3d 338, 344 (7th Cir 1997).
103 See Nagareda, 115 Harv L Rev at 751-52 (cited in note 47).
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creases.'° The need for sophisticated and thus costly experts in mass torts
can exacerbate this problem.' The nationwide class action brought
against tobacco companies in the early 1990s included upwards of for-

ty million putative class members. At the same time it wound its way
through the courts, the companies faced approximately one hundred
pending individual cases.'6 Assuredly, many of the putative class
members had no viable right to sue. Nonetheless, even if only 1 percent of them did, the class would have exceeded by a factor of four
thousand, the number of plaintiffs who pursued individual actions. Assuredly, the tobacco companies' well-known, exhaustive, and cutthroat
litigation strategy' dissuaded plenty of plaintiffs' lawyers from filing
otherwise potentially valuable cases on behalf of individual clients.
Plaintiffs' lawyers may devise ways to spread litigation costs across
individual clients without recourse to class actions;"" the point remains,
though, that transaction costs may thwart solo efforts to vindicate
even abstractly valuable rights to sue."1

104

See Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion,Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Ac-

tions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057, 1059-60 (2002).
105 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation,57 Stan L Rev 1475,
1519 (2005).
106 See Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative Assessment, 51 DePaul L Rev
331, 335 (2001). The numerous individual actions that have been filed since the termination of
the nationwide tobacco class action owe their realizability, at least in part, to the failed class
action. As Robert Rabin observes, these cases became attractive to lawyers in part because of the
discovery produced in the class case. See id at 345.
107 See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation,44 Stan L Rev

853,857-58 (1992).
108 See, for example, Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, III, The Decision to Reject the June, 1997
NationalSettlement and Proceed to Trial, 25 Wm Mitchell L Rev 397,418 (1999), reprinting State
of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General,Hubert H. Humphrey III,Attorney General,Tobacco Proposal- PreliminaryAnalysis (July 18,1997).

109As discussed above, Nagareda describes this process, by which plaintiffs' lawyers compile
inventories of claimants, as part of the mass tort maturity cycle (p 16). Plaintiffs' lawyers' ability to
spread costs of generic litigation assets across individual cases means that the class action mechanism is hardly the sole device that enables lawyers to realize these rights to sue. See generally How-

ard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Proceduraland Ethical Implications of Coordination

among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 Duke L J 381 (2000) (discussing the implications of "informal aggregation" by lawyers who coordinate their efforts on cases that remain formally independent). Whatever implications this observation has for class actions, it shows that one plaintiffs
right to sue may not be realizable without other plaintiffs pursuing their rights to sue as well.
110 See, for example, Ortiz, 527 US at 867-68 (Breyer dissenting):
[Tihe alternative to class-action settlement is not a fair opportunity for each potential
plaintiff to have his or her own day in court. Unusually high litigation costs, unusually long
delays, and limitations upon the total amount of resources available for payment together
mean that most potential plaintiffs may not have a realistic alternative.
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A tidal wave of individual lawsuits might also make a right to sue
unrealizable absent some form of aggregate proceeding."' Early individual lawsuits against a defendant may exhaust its coffers, extinguishing rights to sue both in formal terms-the defendant might declare

bankruptcy' -and in real ones-the right to sue can become worthless
and hence pointless to attempt to vindicate."3 Relatedly, when a tort is
truly massive, only those individuals who can sprint to the courthouse

door can prosecute their claim, leaving to those slower off the mark a
long queue to wait in and an individual right to sue that exists in the
abstract and has no meaning in reality."' Judge Robert Parker famously

observed in the Texas asbestos litigation that the defendants' strategyto "assert a right to individual trials in each case and assert the right to
repeatedly contest in each case every contestable issue"-meant in prac-

tical terms that, absent aggregation, "these cases will never be tried.'
Rights to sue, even nominally valuable ones, might prove unrealizable without the class action device because psychological barriers might
preclude individual actions."6 A plaintiff might never know she has a right
to sue absent a class action."' A plaintiff may need the anonymity of
absent class member status in order to feel comfortable prosecuting her
claim."" Whether the reason be conflict avoidance, indifference, or some-

111 See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff Administering DamageAwards in Mass-tort Litigation, 10 Rev Litig 463, 464-65 (1991) (arguing that delay and an absence of a credible threat of
litigation can render even meritorious claims valueless).
112 For example, repeated litigation against Johns-Manville drove the company into bankruptcy. Once this happened, future claimants lost their rights to sue the company. See Kane v JohnsManville Corp, 843 F2d 636,640 (2d Cir 1988) (detailing a bankruptcy reorganization plan that only
allowed claimants to sue a trust rather than Johns-Manville, its operating entities, or its insurers).
113 See, for example, In re Telectronics PacingSystem, Inc, 137 F Supp 2d 985, 1015 (SD Ohio
2001) (describing the class action as having reached a point of diminishing returns where, given the
defendants' limited assets, going forward would decrease the likelihood of recovering damages).
114 Glen 0. Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va L Rev
1481, 1503 (1992) (noting that in mass torts, some individual claims will be adjudicated but others
will not given the limits of the judicial system).
115 Cimino, 751 F Supp at 651-52.
116 See, for example, Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734,748 n 26 (5th Cir 1996).
117 See, for example, Schwarm v Craighead,233 FRD 655, 664 (ED Cal 2006); Clark v
Bonded Adjustment Co, 204 FRD 662,666 (ED Wash 2002). Thomas E. Willging suggests that the
provision of notice in the breast implant class action, a mass tort with nominally valuable claims,
attracted a significant number of claimants who might not otherwise have filed suit. See Willging,
148 U Pa L Rev at 2256 (cited in note 7). Deborah R. Hensler reports that the significant increases in asbestos claims in the late 1990s may well have happened as a result of class action
notice campaigns as part of the Amchem and Ortiz litigation. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time
Goes By:Asbestos Litigationafter Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tex L Rev 1899, 1908 (2002).
118 See, for example, Scott vAetna Service4 Inc, 210 FRD 261,268 (D Conn 2002) (concluding
that class action was more appropriate because, among other things, "class members may fear
reprisal and would not be inclined to pursue individual claims"); O'Brien v Encotech Construction Services,Inc, 203 FRD 346,350-51 (ND Ill 2001) (same); Ansoumana v Gristede's Operating
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thing else, most people eschew litigation even when they have potentially
valuable claims. 9 In contrast, cases that proceed on some sort of mass
basis, either as class actions or pursuant to some other mechanism of aggregation, can lead to significantly higher rates of claims.2 '
Psychological reactions to large-scale class actions among judges
might also transform otherwise unrealizable rights to sue into realizable
ones. These might include the temptation to right a historic wrong or to
craft some form of rough justice on behalf of a large and sympathetic
class. Judge Jack Weinstein famously pushed through a $180 million
settlement for members of the Agent Orange class, then afterward
dismissed cases brought by opt-outs in part because the government
contractor defense barred their claims."' A single individual, suing
alone and thus lacking the same world-historical appeal, might not
tempt the judge to assume the same active management of litigation.
Moreover, while the practice has earned its share of criticism,'" courts
on occasion alter requirements of underlying substantive law to enable a class to meet certification standards, markedly altering the contours of a plaintiff's right to sue. ' 2

Corp, 201 FRD 81,85-86 (SDNY 2001) (same); Slanina v William Penn Parking Corp,Inc, 106 FRD
419,423-24 (WD Pa 1984) (same).
119 This phenomenon is true for tort. See, for example, Thomas A. Eaton, et al, Another Brick
in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 Ga L Rev 1049, 1096
(2000) (finding a trend of underclaiming rather than overclaiming by Americans who have been
injured by negligence); Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass Personal
Injury Litigation:A Socio-legal Analysis, 59 Brooklyn L Rev 961, 1019 (1993) (suggesting possible
explanations for why such a low rate of injured Americans file liability lawsuits). A twenty-year-old
study discovered that this is true for employment discrimination as well. Michele Hoyman and
Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women:An EmpiricalAnalysis,62 Notre Dame L Rev 61,61 (1986).
120 See McGovern, 73 Tex L Rev at 1823 (cited in note 7); Francis E. McGovern, Looking to
the Future of Mass Torts:A Comment on Schuck and Siciliano,80 Cornell L Rev 1022,1024 (1995).
121 See In re "Agent Orange" ProductLiability LitigationMDL No 381,818 F2d 145,159 (2d
Cir 1987) (observing that Judge Weinstein granted summary judgment on government contractor
grounds and because individual opt-outs could not establish individual causation). Judge Weinstein stated with respect to the Agent Orange litigation that "[ilndividual justice is not something
that this court can provide the Viet Nam veteran .... The best we can do with the tools at our
disposal ... is to try and do some type of relative rough justice." CPR Legal Program Annual
Meeting, 9 Alt to the High Cost of Litig 147, 150 (1991). Given many weaknesses in their cases,
the enormous settlement Holocaust victims secured from Swiss banks might also illustrate how a
district judge, bent on vindicating claims no matter how legally implausible, forces through some
class action settlement. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 2000 WL 34417291, *8-9
(EDNY). See also Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice 165-75 (Public Affairs 2003) (describing
how the district judge coordinated both formal and informal meetings with the parties to manage the litigation toward settlement).
122 See Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 821 (1985) (describing as "something of
a 'bootstrap' argument" the notion that underlying substantive doctrine should change to enable
class certification).
123 See, for example, Blackie v Barrack,524 F2d 891,907-08 (9th Cir 1975) (dispensing with
the requirement of proof of reliance in a security fraud class action).
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Class actions in certain instances can perfect substantive rights to
sue that cannot go forward as individual suits. Absent class members
who have not exhausted required administrative remedies, for example,
cannot file their own lawsuits but can join class actions." For at least
one type of claim, some circuits have held that an individual can only
pursue a substantive right as part of a class action and not on her own."'
3. Realization and opt-out rights.
Especially since many claims in mass torts attract counsel only because they can be added to inventories that include stronger claims,
quite often rights to sue are not realizable through individual actions.
Still, I do not intend to argue that most or even many high-value claims
are realizable solely through the avenue opened by the class action.
Rather, the informal barriers to realization described above show that
realization is not reducible to a bright-line marketability boundary but
depends on context. Informal barriers have just as much real-world
bite as legal infirmities that formally extinguish rights to sue. A brightline, one-size-fits-all rule to identify rights to sue as realizable through
individual actions may overlook some of the ways in which individuals
forego their own suits and thus may not work particularly well.
This is not to say that it is impossible to know when rights to sue
may be realized through individual actions. Opt-out rights offer one
generic tool to make this assessment. An individual's decision not to opt
out of a certified damages class signals one of two things. For whatever
reason, the individual's right to sue, at least at the time the class action
proceeds to settlement or judgment, may not be realizable on its own. '
Alternatively, the individual could believe that her right to sue, while
realizable on its own, is better realized by her remaining in the class.
Realization, in other words, is not an all-or-nothing affair. A class action
could be the better, if not the exclusive, procedural avenue for realization. For individuals who do not opt out, it does not matter if they in
theory could bring individual actions, as they gain something by remaining in the class. Interestingly, even for high-value claims, class members
rarely exercise opt-out rights. One study found that less than 5 percent
124 See Abermarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 414 n 8 (1975) (noting that class action
awards of back-pay under Title VII do not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies by
unnamed class members).
125 See, for example, Davis v Coca-Cola Bottling Co Consolidated,516 F3d 955, 958 (11th
Cir 2008) (holding that a Title VII plaintiff cannot pursue a pattern-or-practice claim unless he
does so as part of a class action); Bacon v Honda of America Manufacturing,Inc, 370 F3d 565,
575 (6th Cir 2004) (same).
126 This scenario could include instances when the individual simply does not care about her
right to sue or is unaware that she has one. Either circumstance amounts to a psychological
barrier to suit that in real terms precludes realization absent the class action.
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of class members in mass tort cases, which generally have higher-value
claims than most other class actions, opted out.2 , An individual might
not receive notice and thus miss the opt-out window, but such missed
opportunities are less likely as the value of the claim increases.'2
B.

Realized Rights, Class Actions, and the Entity Theory

The distinction between realized and unrealized rights to sue, and
the recognition that the class action mechanism may provide the only
or superior procedural avenue for realization, can add normative support to Shapiro's "entity theory" of the class action."' Professor Shapiro's entity theory conceives of a class as more than the sum of its individual parts and supports the notion that the law can consider the interests of the class as a whole apart from and even prior to interests of
individual class members.' If individuals owe their realized rights to
sue to the class, the class should have entity status.
1. The entity theory and its critics.
The class action fits into one of what Shapiro calls "two models of
'group litigation."'1 3' The first treats the class action as nothing more
than a technique for joinder of individual claimants. "Under this view,"
Shapiro observes, "the individual who is part of the aggregate surrenders as little autonomy as possible."'' 2 Because each plaintiff controls her
own right to sue, the first model requires that class-wide proceedings
pay scrupulous heed to due process-based individual autonomy concerns of class members. I suspect that, given his claim that the class action mechanism must take members' preexisting property rights as givens, Nagareda shares this vicw. qe second model construes the class
as something more than the sum of its parts, an "entity" like a corporation or a union that enjoys its own jural identity distinct from its constiSee Eisenberg and Miller, 57 Vand L Rev at 1532, 1541-42 (cited in note 72).
See, for example, Issacharoff, 77 Notre Dame L Rev at 1061 (cited in note 104) (describing high-value claims as more likely to promote vigilance by class members).
129 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 918-19 (cited in note 6). As he notes, Professor Shapiro "borrowed" the term "entity" from Edward Cooper. See id. See also Edward H. Cooper, Rule
23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process,71 NYU L Rev 13,28 (1996) (discussing the benefits of
treating a class as an "entity"). For an earlier treatment of similar issues, see generally Diane
Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions:Joinder or RepresentationalDevice?, 1983 S Ct Rev 459 (discussing the joinder model and the representational model in class action). See also Charles Alan Wright,
et al, 18A Federal Practice & Procedure § 4455 at 486 (2002) (contrasting the traditional, narrow
view of class action with the newer view that highlights the efficiency, finality, and consistency
127

128

advantages of a class claim).
130 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 940-41 (cited in note 6). But see Coffee, 100 Colum L
Rev at 379 (cited in note 47) (criticizing the entity theory).
131 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 918 (cited in note 6).
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tuent members.' This model can "severely limitf"an individual's right to
so.134
control class proceedings if the interests of the class warrant doing
Thus, notice and opt-out rights are less important, " ' class counsel may
justifiably owe her chief allegiance to the class and not individual memto indibers,"6 and judges can approve settlements that may be unfair
13
vidual class members if they maximize overall class interests.0
Shapiro supports his preference for the entity theory with three
pragmatic arguments. "8 The first balances an individual's interest to
control her right to sue against the reality that punctilious respect for
this interest often proves unduly expensive and may preclude "a fair
and effective outcome.' 39 A focus on individual interests should yield to
the class's interest, not only for small value claims'4 but also for higher
value claims where economies of scale that come with group litigation
would lead to savings and distributional equities for class members.''
Second, Shapiro stresses the deterrence and compensatory goals of
tort law and how a treatment of the class as an entity best serves those
goals.' 2 A finding that a defendant in a mass tort has caused any particular individual's harm sufficient to meet a burden of proof may be
impossible, even as epidemiological data or the like establish that the
defendant has injured one-third of the relevant population. While individual suits might consistently run aground, an entity theory makes
the class-the population itself-the litigant and leads to an award to
the class in direct proportion to the harm the defendant causes."'
Third, Shapiro argues that a social interest in the efficient use of litigation resources can outweigh autonomy interests and justify subordinating the individual to the group as a whole."
Shapiro's critics, most prominently John Coffee and Martin Redish,
find these pragmatic rationales unsatisfying. Professor Coffee argues
that, while the law gives certain groups like unions and groups of share-

133

Id at 919.

Id. For support among other prominent commentators on class actions, see Issacharoff,
77 Notre Dame L Rev at 1060 (cited in note 104) (observing "increasing skepticism over the
view that a class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual claims"); Nancy J. Moore,
Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U Ill L Rev 1477, 1483-86 (espousing the
entity model as most appropriate for class actions and as a workable solution to ethics concerns).
135 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 936-38 (cited in note 6).
134
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137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id at 940.
Id at 941.
See id at 923,931,933.
Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 923 (cited in note 6).
Id at 924.
Id at 928.
See id at 931.
See Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 931 (cited in note 6).
See id at 933.
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holders identities distinct from their individual members, no normative
justification supports doing so for the damages class action.'45 Many
members do not consent to inclusion in the class in any real sense, for
example, "' and the class action does not come with a majoritarian mechanism like shareholder voting rights by which members can exert
control.' Efficiency arguments like Shapiro's can justify class treatment of particular claims, but even in these instances they do not justify a treatment that ranks the class as an entity above individual class
members and their autonomy interests. W
Professor Redish attacks the entity theory as confusing "the reality
of externally imposed practical limitations on the individual's ability to
control his chose [that is, property] with the abstract, pristine nature of
the chose itself." 9 Each individual comes to the class action with "pristine pre-procedural substantive rights" protected by the Due Process
Clause.'m If the class were an entity, distinct from its constituent parts,
then class certification would amount to a "mystical transformation of
these claims" into entity-held rights to sue.M But the underlying substantive law rarely, if ever, creates a substantive right to sue in classes
as entities.' 2 The entity theory would strip individually held and individually controlled property rights from their owners and vest them in
a class. The class action rule is a mere procedural mechanism limited
by the Rules Enabling Act and cannot have this effect."' Standard due
process balancing can allow cases proceeding as class actions to depart
from the full panoply of protections individuals enjoy for their rights
to sue. The entity theory, however, is a fig leaf that disguises an attempt to make class actions easier to bring by defining away the individual autonomy interests that have erected hurdles in the path of
their prosecution.'

145 See Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 380-85 (cited in note 47) (identifying factors not typically present in class actions such as consent, majoritarian control, prior association, and homogenous preferences that justify entity treatment for corporations and unions).
146 Id at 381.
147

Id at 382.

148 Id at 385.
149 Martin H. Redish and Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundationsof ProceduralDue Process,95 Cal L Rev 1573,1592 (2007).
150 Id at 1597.

151

Id.

See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U Chi Legal F 71,97.
153 Redish and Larsen, 95 Cal L Rev at 1596 (cited in note 149).
152
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Id at 1597.
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2. Realized rights and the entity theory.
Both Coffee and Redish begin their criticism of the entity theory
from the same point of departure. Coffee asks why "an individual possessing legally recognized claims should be compelled to accept the determination of an entity.. 5 Redish argues that individuals come to class
actions with "pristine pre-procedural substantive rights" that they, not
the entity, own. "6 In other words, both basically share Nagareda's concept of preexisting rights to sue as provided for in substantive law. "7 The
entity theory collides with due process, because the class action mechanism, a mere procedural device, lacks the lawmaking power to strip
individuals of their property rights and vest them in a cass."
This point of departure, I believe, makes horses of wishes. It
draws an unduly formalist distinction between the substantive components of a right to sue, defined abstractly in terms of elements of a
cause of action, and the procedural avenue that makes its attempted
vindication possible. If the class action offers the only viable procedural avenue for an individual to realize her right to sue, then the individual owes some component of this right to the class. Even if the
class action offers the superior, if not exclusive, avenue for realization,
the individual's right to sue when joined to the class nonetheless has a
different and enhanced quality. If the class amounted to nothing more
than the mere joinder of individuals, it would group together unrealized rights. Because the formation of the class makes realization possible, the class is more than the sum of its constituent parts. In other
words, the class action has a transformative effect, one that is hardly
mystical but instead a product of realities that make rights to sue unrealizable in individual suits.
Moreover, "pristine pre-procedural substantive rights," if unrealizable on their own, may not deserve or even enjoy the sort of due
process protection that places a premium on individual autonomy in
the first place. Due process enters into the equation because rights to sue
are property rights. This observation alone does little analytical work, and
it remains open what qualities of a right to sue trigger due process protection. The due process status of unrealized rights to sue is arguably quite
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Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 381 (cited in note 47) (emphasis added).
Redish and Larsen, 95 Cal L Rev at 1597 (cited in note 149).
It bears mention that Redish goes much further than Nagareda and suggests that the

requirement that class actions respect "preexisting substantive legal rights" renders significant
parts of class action practice, including settlement classes, unconstitutional. See, for example,
Redish and Kastanek, 73 U Chi L Rev at 551-52 (cited in note 78) (arguing that class action
undermines the protections of Article III's adverseness requirement).
158 Redish, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 97 (cited in note 152) (explaining how class action procedure under an entity model transforms substantive rights).

2008)

Some Realism about Mass Torts

tenuous. Several components of what makes property property for the
sake of due process suggest why this is so. Settlements and judgments
are sales of rights to sue. An unrealized right to sue lacks any procedural avenue for its attempted vindication, that is, a means to reach settlement or judgment, and is thus inalienable. It thereby lacks a characteristic often recognized as an essential component of a property right.'59
Walter Wheeler Cook suggested that the legal power to bring about a
judgment is a constituent element of a right to sue as a property
right. " OAn unrealized right to sue affords its holder no such power.
Most germanely, the Supreme Court's recent procedural due process
jurisprudence, as Thomas Merrill describes it, suggests that something
is property for the purposes of due process if it has "some ascertainable monetary value."' 6' An unrealized right to sue has no value because
it cannot be sold. Outside the due process context, property that merits constitutional protection does not do so because it exists in some
abstract sense but because its holder can do something in the real
world with that property. 62 An individual does not enjoy status for the
purposes of due process as an individual with an unrealized right to
sue but as a class member-part of an entity-with a realized right.
Although one could object on formalist grounds,' 6' my guess is that
few would worry about sacrificed individual autonomy if courts treated
classes of low-value claimants as entities. This shift would obviate the

159 See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 53-55 (Clarenden
1988); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum L Rev 970, 970 (1985). See also
Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 Wash U L Q 739, 750 (1986) (describing alienation as "one of the most important liberal indicia of property").
160 See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 Harv L Rev 816, 819-20
(1916) (analyzing the implications of owning a chose in action). For a more recent discussion of
rights to sue as property rights, see Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co. and the "Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause,
31 Emory L J 491,491-92 (1982).
161 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 Va L Rev 885, 964
(2000). See also Castle Rock v Gonzales, 545 US 748, 766 (2005) (endorsing Merrill's description). This description of the Court's definition of property for due process purposes fits the
consensus among lower courts that a right to sue only "vests" as a property right and thus merits
robust due process protection when it is reduced to a final, unreviewable judgment. See, for
example, Fields v Legacy Health System, 413 F3d 943, 956 (9th Cir 2005); In re TMI, 89 F3d
1106, 1113 (3d Cir 1996); Salmon v Schwarz, 948 F2d 1131, 1143 (10th Cir 1991); Arbour v
Jenkins, 903 F2d 416,420 (6th Cir 1990); Sowell v American Cynamid Co, 888 F2d 802,805 (11th
Cir 1989); Hammond v United States, 786 F2d 8,12 (1st Cir 1986).
162 See, for example, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470,
498-99 (1987) (refusing to declare a state statute that required landowners to leave a small percentage of coal in the ground a taking because as a practical matter landowners could only mine
a certain percentage of coal regardless).
163 Redish and Larsen, 95 Cal L Rev at 1597 (cited in note 149) (arguing that the class
treatment of negative value claimants creates a foundational flaw by erroneously extending
rights that confer individual causes of action onto the class).
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need for a questionable set of procedures, like individualized notice,
designed to affirm virtually nonexistent individual autonomy interests." However, whereas Shapiro argues for a much greater restriction
of opt-out rights, my distinction between realized and unrealized rights
cannot support his argument for their limitation, appealing as it is.'O My
argument strengthens his entity theory because, when rights to sue are
otherwise unrealizable, I deny that individuals come to the class with
fully coalesced individual rights to sue that warrant primary and scrupulous deference. As argued, in any particular class action, barriers to
realization are such that it is difficult to tell with confidence ex ante
whether individual members could realize their rights to sue on their
own. They can in some high-value instances and not in others.
Because context, that is, particular circumstances for each class
member, matters, opt-out rights are crucial. They operate as a safety
valve to guard against the erroneous assignment to the class as an entity of rights to sue that are realizable as individual actions.'66 They also
buttress the case for subordinating the interests of members who do
not opt out to the class as a whole. Again, the decision not to exercise
the right signals that the individual right to sue is either only realizable or better realized through the class action mechanism. If this is so,
the class member enjoys something by virtue of her class membership
that does not exist for her otherwise, justifying a theory that privileges
the class as an entity.
This role for opt-out rights collides with Nagareda's claim that
global peacemaking needs a complete termination of claimants' access
to the tort system. Nagareda's ideal type in this respect is the fen-phen
debacle, when back-end opt-out rights doomed the class settlement
164 See, for example, Debra Lyn Bassett, Constructing Class Action Reality, 2006 BYU L
Rev 1415, 1466-67 (2006) (noting the restraints of judicial economy and efficiency on rigorously
representing absent class members); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort
Reform via Rule 23, 80 Cornell L Rev 858, 889 (1995) (commenting on "the indifference the
courts have exhibited toward providing notice and the right to opt out in" some small-value
consumer class actions); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Tort%and "Settlement
Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 Cornell L Rev 811, 824 (1995) (arguing that notice to class
members can be less in small-value class actions). For example, in Mullane v CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306,319 (1950), the court disposed with personal service of process on
parties whose addresses were unknown in part because they had "small interests" at stake. For
criticism of individualized notice in small-value class actions, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic
Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 27-33 (1991).
165 See Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 954-55 (cited in note 6) (suggesting that opt-out
rights hurt the substantive interests and integrity of the class as a whole).
166 For an approach to opt-out rights that treats them as a sort of due process safety valve,
see Robinson v Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co, 267 F3d 147, 165-66 (2d Cir 2001) (deeming notice and opt-out rights to absent class members as adequately eliminating any due process
risk in Rule 23(b)(2) class certification).
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(p 147). Before opt-out rights-a fundamental due process plank for
most aggregate litigation-have to yield, a broader empirical basis for
Nagareda's disenchantment would be helpful. One could make the
case that Wyeth made poor litigation choices as it tried to settle its
way out of fen-phen liability,'7 and that other mass tort defendants have
already learned to avoid the sorts of mistakes Wyeth made that encouraged a stampede of opt-outs. ' 6 These mistakes, not something intrinsic
to opt-out rights, perhaps should shoulder some blame for the fen-phen
settlement's instability. Indeed, Nagareda himself, prior to the fenphen meltdown, argued that opt-out rights can encourage peacemaking
lawyers to craft settlements that will deter high-value claimants from
opting out and thereby strengthen a settlement's viability.16 At any rate,
in practical terms there may not be a great deal of difference between
my preference that opt-out rights be maintained and the implementation of Nagareda's leveraging proposal; as argued above, the delay the
proposal would engender might allow opt-outs to prosecute their own
actions before the agency adopted the settlement as a final rule.
C.

Implications for Nagareda's Leveraging Proposal

Although I disagree with his point of departure, my argument for
the realist perspective on rights to sue can help implement the fee
arrangement at the heart of Nagareda's leveraging proposal. Despite
my concerns with its practical implementation, the fee arrangement is
definitely worth a shot, especially since peacemaking in mass torts has
proven a barren enterprise in recent years. The claim that a class includes members whose rights to sue are either only or better realized
through class actions gives normative support to a theory of the class as
an entity. This entity theory in turn justifies judicial power to impose the
leveraging proposal and obviates the need for agency involvement.
As explained in Part I.D, Nagareda's leveraging proposal would better serve the interests of the class as a whole, including future claimants,
because it would align the interests of plaintiffs' counsel negotiating a
settlement with future claimants. It would both maximize the size of the
pie for all claimants and best allocate the settlement fairly for present
and future claimants alike (pp 238,242). The problem with implementation, as Nagareda sees it, is that peacemaking attorneys have contrac167

See note 55.

168 See Daniel Fisher, Will the Vioxx Settlement Work?, Forbes (Nov 13, 2007), online at

http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/12/merck-vioxx-lawsuits-biz-health-czdf-1112vioxx.htmi (visited
Aug 29, 2008) (describing how Merck in the Vioxx settlement put in measures to ensure that
physicians-for-hire could not diagnose nonexistent injuries, a problem that helped sink the fenphen settlement).
169 See Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 173 (cited in note 67).

1994

The University of Chicago Law Review

[75:1949

tual relationships with present claimants only, and that these contracts
generally provide for fees pegged to what these clients recover (pp 25152). He argues that courts scrutinizing class settlements lack the authority to override these contracts, except that they enjoy the equitable
power to increase the client's share when the contract would otherwise
yield excessive fees for the lawyer (p 252). Because it ensures equitable
compensation for all claimants, Nagareda's leveraging proposal may
end up reducing the take-home for present claimants, the peacemakers'
clients. Nagareda finds "ironic" the notion that courts would use their
equitable powers, usually employed to make clients better off, to void fee
contracts and put in their stead a fee regime that would make clients

worse off (p 252). Hence the need for agency rulemaking, with its unquestioned power to set aside private contracts (p 254).
The entity theory aside, I question whether existing doctrine prec-

ludes a court at the settlement approval stage from overriding attorney-client contracts in the interest of fairness to the class as a whole,
even if the override takes money away from the settling attorney's nominal clients.7 ' The Third Circuit, for example, has described "[p]rivate
arrangements individual class members may have with counsel" as
"simply irrelevant" when it comes to structuring a fee award. 1 Moreover, courts not only have the power to override whatever fee arrangements class counsel might have crafted, they also can override
private contracts entered into between lawyers and inventory clients
as these clients file claims with the settlement."" This power may include the power to defer collection of fees by class counsel to the future to ensure that the fees match benefits paid to future claimants.7
170 After certification, the attorney has an attorney-client relationship with the class as a
whole and arguably owes primary fiduciary duties to the class and not particular class members.
See Van Gemert v Boeing Co,590 F2d 433,440 n 15 (2d Cir 1978) (describing how class counsel
must advocate vigorously on behalf of absentee class members who are bound by judgment).
171 See Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp, 540
F2d 102, 120 (3d Cir 1976). See also Alan Hirsch and Diane Sheehey, Awarding Attorneys' Fees
and Managing Fee Litigation 71 (Federal Judicial Center 1994) (citing Lindy Brothers approvingly). The Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) provides that "the court may not rewrite the
parties' agreement," but this statement is not inconsistent with the claim that the court can set
aside a private agreement. Manualfor Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.7, 335 (Federal Judicial
Center 2004). It is hard to evaluate what the Manual means by this statement, as it cites no authority in support. See id. The American Bar Association reported in 2006 that the power of a
court to set aside fee contracts is uncertain. See Task Force on Contingent Fees of the American
Bar Association's Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, ContingentFees in Mass Tort Litigation, 42 Tort Trial & Ins Prac L J 105, 124-25 (2006) (stating that in principle authority exists for
judges to regulate contingent fee contracts).
172 See In re Joint Eastern and Southern DistrictsAsbestos Litigation, 878 F Supp 473, 558
(EDNY 1995).
173 See FRCP 23(h), Advisory Committee's Notes to the 2003 Amendments ("In some cases
(involving future payments from a settlement regime], it may be appropriate to defer some
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Courts also have ample power to ensure an equitable allocation among
the class as a whole, regardless of what sorts of private arrangements
class counsel have with particular members,"' and to use fairness of
allocation as a factor to decide what sort of fee to award.'75
Assuming that Nagareda is correct, however, the entity theory
provides a normative basis for implementation of his leveraging proposal without requiring agency action. The entity theory makes the
class the client and puts the interests of the class before the interests of
particular class members. Class counsel thus owe their primary allegiance to the class and not to the individual class members.', If Nagareda is right that his leveraging proposal would maximize the size of the pie,
a court could set aside private arrangements between class counsel and
individual class members in the interest of ensuring that class counsel
does not shortchange the class for her own benefit. Moreover, if counsel
owes an obligation to the class, she owes an indivisible obligation to all
class members, including future claimants. A court could override a private agreement that would result in future claimants being shortchanged,
on grounds that it unduly enriches their counsel.
Nagareda supports his turn to rulemaking with the argument
that his proposal would not require the creation of any new bureaucracy (p 251). He acknowledges, however, that his proposal would require "an initial delegation of rulemaking authority," that is, federal legislation (p 258). The entity theory that makes a class the client would
require no such significant legal change. In a number of ways, existing
law that regulates the relationship between class counsel, individuals
with whom they have contractual relationships, and classes as wholes
treats classes as entities to whom attorneys owe primary allegiance.
Nancy Moore points out, for example, that class counsel can recommend a settlement even if her nominal client, the class representative,
portion of the fee award until actual payouts to class members are known."); Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.71 at 336-37 (cited in note 171) (describing appropriate circumstances that may require attorneys to take as fees some portion of in-kind benefits or defer all or
some of their collection of fees pending distribution of benefits); id § 22.927 at 461 (observing
that deferred payment of attorney fees may be appropriate for settlements with nonmonetary or
deferred payments to claimants).
174 See, for example, Staton v Boeing Co, 327 F3d 938, 975-78 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that
the district court abused its discretion in approving a settlement that had a large damage award
differential between named and unnamed plaintiffs).
175 See R. Eric Kennedy, Class Action Attorney Fees: The Key Role of the FederalDistrictJudge
in Fashioning & Monitoring Mass-tort Common Fund Distributionsto Assure a Settlement Deemed
Equitable by Both Represented & UnrepresentedClass Members, & Both Private & Class Counsel, 6 Sedona Conf J 173,175 (2005).
176 Shapiro, 73 Notre Dame L Rev at 941 (cited in note 6).
177 Consider ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-18 ("A lawyer employed
or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity.").
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disagrees.' Indeed, class counsel can continue to represent the class
even if the class representatives with whom they have a professional
services contract object to a settlement. '"
Once a class is certified, an attorney arguably represents all class

members as individuals joined to an aggregate proceeding. In a number
of ways, however, attorneys also owe obligations to putative classes, "
and these obligations can supersede obligations to individual class rep-

resentatives. For example, when a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer of
judgment to a class representative in a putative class action, the plain-

tiff's attorney does not need to accept it on her client's behalf, even if
the defendant offers the maximum amount the class representative requests as damages." The defendant must make the offer of judgment to
'the indivisible class' as a whole, even precertification, and its failure to

do so means that it has not made an offer to a recognized 'offeree' for
the purposes of Rule 68. 1 2 Analogously, class counsel may have to turn

down a settlement offer to the class representative if it runs counter to
the interests of the putative class members, even if it serves the interest
of the counsel's nominal client. "' A class representative owes something
to the class and thus should not use the leverage a putative class offers

to procure an advantageous settlement for herself alone. 0' In other
ways as well class counsel and putative classes enjoy a form of an attorney-client relationship."' The fact that these rules apply before a class is
certified is significant; putative classes are not the aggregation of indi-

See Moore, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 1484-85 (cited in note 134).
Lazy Oil Co v Witco Corp, 166 F3d 581,590 (3d Cir 1999).
180 See In re General Motors Corp Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55
F3d 768, 801 (3d Cir 1995) (observing in the context of deciding a fee award that class counsel
"owe the entire class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed"). See also generally Gates v
Rohm and Haas Co, 2006 WL 3420591, *2 (ED Pa) (acknowledging uncertainty over whether class
members are clients protected under attorney-client privilege); Schick v Berg, 2004 WL 856298, *4-6
(SDNY) (discussing the nuances of the scope of the fiduciary duty owed to class members).
181 But see Abraham v Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc, 1991 WL 89917 (WDNY).
182 See McDowall v Cogan, 216 FRD 46, 50 (EDNY 2003). See also Weiss v Regal Collections, 385 F3d 337,347 (3d Cir 2004).
183 See Caston v Mr. T's Apparel, Inc, 157 FRD 31, 33 (SD Miss 1994). See also Shelton v
Pargo,Inc, 582 F2d 1298, 1315 (4th Cir 1978) (stating that a court should make sure that "under
the guise of compromising the plaintiff's individual claim, the parties have not compromised the
class claim to the pecuniary advantage of the plaintiff and/or his attorney").
184 Caston, 157 FRD at 33.
185 For example, the mere filing of a class action empowers a court to regulate the defendant's
178
179

communications with putative class members. See Gulf Oil Co v Bernard, 452 US 89, 101-02
(1981); Bublitz v E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co, 196 FRD 545, 549 (SD Iowa 2000). See also
generally Debra Lynn Bassett, Pre-certificationCommunicationEthics in ClassActions, 36 Ga L
Rev 353 (2002) (discussing the need to address communications between attorney and potential
class members before class certification).
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viduals, because prior to certification no court has determined formally to join them to the action'm
A treatment of the class as an entity, already the implicitly operative theory in areas of class action law, strengthens a judge's power to
implement Nagareda's leveraging proposal without rulemaking. An
agency nonetheless would have one advantage over a court in this respect. Plaintiffs' lawyers representing high-value present claimants who
do not want to risk a diminution of fees might advise their clients to opt
out of the settlement and pursue individual litigation. As discussed, a
sufficient number of these high-value opt-outs could imperil the global
peace. By adopting the settlement as a rule, the agency can preclude
all claimants' access to tort and thus prevent opt-outs. Lawyers with
high-value claimants can no longer threaten the settlement's viability.
A court in contrast almost assuredly cannot set aside private contracts
and impose the leveraging proposal on lawyers representing opt-outs.
Certainly the entity theory gives the court no such power, as an opt-out
is no longer part of the class-as-entity. Without a compulsory rule in
place, the leveraging proposal might give lawyers representing highvalue claimants an incentive to steer their clients away from the global
settlement and toward potentially more lucrative individual litigation.
Whether peacemaking without rulemaking would run aground for
this reason and whether rulemaking as Nagareda proposes would solve
the opt-out problem are questions open to dispute. Again, a broader empirical basis would help establish whether opt-outs necessarily threaten
the viability of global peace, or whether the fen-phen settlement is exceptional in this regard. Also, while a rule, once final, would solve the optout problem, delay in the rulemaking process would give opt-outs time to
pursue their own settlements and judgments. Finally, peacemakers could
use other techniques to deter opt-outs, techniques that would not require
either agency rulemaking or a court order for implementation)a

186 See Rolo v City Investing Co Liquidating Trust, 155 F3d 644, 659 (3d Cir 1998) ("The
class must, however, be certified before it may become a class action. Until the putative class is
certified, the action is one between [the named class representatives] and the defendants.").
187 The Vioxx settlement agreement, for example, includes provisions that require any plaintiffs' lawyer who represents clients collecting from the settlement to recommend to 100 percent of

that lawyer's clients to collect from the settlement. If any one client refuses and wants to pursue an
individual settlement or judgment, the attorney either has to withdraw from representing the client or
withdraw from representing all other clients. See Settlement Agreement between Merck & Co, Inc,
and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto § 1.2.8, online at http://www.merck.com/
newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement.Agreement.pdf (visited Aug 29, 2008). In other words, the lawyer has a choice between losing all fees she might reap from collection through the settlement or
losing fees she might reap if her individual client succeeds as an opt-out.
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CONCLUSION

Mass Torts in a World of Settlement succeeds for three reasons.

First, Nagareda assembles a vast array of data on mass torts into a
framework that illuminates with precision the quandaries that privatized peacemaking creates. Second, he offers a compelling public law
vision of mass torts. This nominally private litigation actually works as
a form of governance. As such, a public law solution-if not Nagareda's
leveraging proposal, than perhaps something similar-may indeed
chart a way out of the dilemmas he convincingly describes. Finally, the
book is nothing if not stimulating, a virtue I hope my challenge to the
notion of preexisting rights to sue highlights. Future efforts to wrestle
with peacemaking challenges in mass torts will have to account for,
and may well be inspired by, Nagareda's argument.

